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I. INTRODUCTION 
Near the end of the latest edition of my Medical Technology 
casebook, I note the following puzzle: 
Imagine that, after the implantation of a left ventricular 
assist device (LVAD) for a failing heart, an ambulatory but 
miserable patient asks a physician to deactivate it—would 
 
       †  Professor of Law, University of Florida.  I would like to thank those who 
attended my paper presentation as part of the Grand Rounds in Cardiology series 
at UF’s Health Sciences Center.  This project provided the occasion for my 
inaugural foray into end-of-life issues.  My title alludes to a classic song from the 
disco era, subsequently popularized by Gloria Estefan among others (and narrowly 
beating out Sting’s “Be Still My Beating Heart” for my purpose). 
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that fall within the constitutional right to request the 
removal of ventilators or other forms of artificial (though 
external) life-support equipment, or is it more akin to 
requesting physician-assisted suicide (after all, a heart 
transplant patient who fares poorly and regrets his choice 
presumably would have no right to ask a surgeon simply to 
remove the new organ or perhaps try to “deactivate” it by 
applying a strong electrical current)?1 
Pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) 
pose similar questions, and medical ethicists have given this 
conundrum a fair amount of attention,2 but the legal academic 
literature seemingly has had nothing to say about it.  In light of 
likely future increases in the utilization of cardiac-assist devices and 
continued technological advances, the problem will not 
conveniently go away.3  My article offers a sustained analysis of this 
intriguing question, and it also provides an opportunity to consider 
broader issues about the legality of physician aid in dying from a 
distinctive angle that none of the participants in that debate has 
explored. 
 
 1. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1148 (3d ed. 2012) 
(adding that pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators may pose 
equally “tricky bioethical questions”). 
 2. See infra Part III.  A pair of front-page Washington Post articles on the 
subject included useful summaries of the ethical debate.  See Rob Stein, Devices Can 
Interfere with Peaceful Death: Implants Repeatedly Shock Hearts of Patients Who Cannot Be 
Saved, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at A1 (“The problem is an example of the 
consequences of medical technologies proliferating before the ethical, 
psychological and logistic issues they raise have been resolved.”); Rob Stein, Heart 
Pump Creates Life-Death Ethical Dilemmas, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at A1 (“Most 
doctors and bioethicists equate [LVADs] to ventilators, feeding tubes and other 
forms of life support that patients or their families have the right to 
discontinue . . . , [though] some say that the devices raise unique issues.”); see also 
Gina Kolata, Extending Life, Defibrillators Can Prolong Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2002, at A1 (“[ICDs] can fundamentally change the end stages of heart disease, 
giving years of life to people who would otherwise die.  Some experts are asking 
whether the devices are going to create a new generation of patients who die slow 
and painful deaths.”); Barry Meier, Lifesaving Devices Can Cause Havoc at Life’s End, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at B1. 
 3. See Eugene B. Wu, The Ethics of Implantable Devices, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 532, 
532 (2007) (“[D]evelopment of a clear ethics for [the] ICD is critical as the 
massive technological advances in implantable heart failure devices will soon 
produce an epidemic of patients with implanted devices and end-of-life diseases.”). 
2
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II. HOSPITALS  ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY: ASSISTED LIVING MEETS THE 
ENERGIZER BUNNY 
Cardiologists have an ever-expanding range of procedures and 
medical devices to use with their patients.4  For instance, 
angioplasty using balloon catheters allows physicians to open 
partially blocked arteries instead of resorting to far riskier coronary 
artery bypass surgery.  The development of stents allowed for the 
insertion of tiny metal scaffolds to help keep these blood vessels 
open, and the advent of drug-eluting stents counteracted the risk of 
clot formation.5  Interventional cardiology has become big 
business, with hospitals opening special “cath labs” to handle the 
increasing volume of patients.6  Heart valve replacement surgery 
 
 4. See Earl S. Ford et al., Explaining the Decrease in U.S. Deaths from Coronary 
Disease, 1980–2000, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2388, 2390–91 tbl.1, 2396–97 (2007); 
Keith A.A. Fox et al., Decline in Rates of Death and Heart Failure in Acute Coronary 
Syndromes, 1999–2006, 297 JAMA 1892, 1898–99 (2007); Mark A. Hlatky, Evidence-
Based Use of Cardiac Procedures and Devices, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2127 (2004); 
Lawrence K. Altman, Cheney File Traces Heart Care Milestones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2012, at D1. 
 5. See Sally Squires, The Selling of the Stent: Costly Drug-Eluting Stents Are Quickly 
Gaining Market Share—but Research on Their Effectiveness Lags, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 
2003, at F1; see also Neal I. Muni & Thomas P. Gross, Problems with Drug-Eluting 
Coronary Stents—The FDA Perspective, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1593 (2004) (discussing 
some of the regulatory issues presented by the introduction of these devices). 
 6. See DAVID S. JONES, BROKEN HEARTS: THE TANGLED HISTORY OF CARDIAC 
CARE 13 (2013) (“Together these procedures [bypass and angioplasty] form a 
$100 billion industry in the United States alone.”); Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, 
A Hospital Chain’s Inquiry Cited Unneeded Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1 
(“Cardiology is a lucrative business for [Hospital Corporation of America], and 
the profits from testing and performing heart surgeries played a critical role in the 
company’s bottom line in recent years.  Some of HCA’s busiest Florida hospitals 
perform thousands of stent procedures each year.”); id. (“HCA has more than 100 
catheterization labs across the country and the one at Lawnwood was a financial 
juggernaut.  It accounted for 35 percent of the hospital’s net profits, according to 
financial documents.”); Jane E. Brody, More Isn’t Always Better in Coronary Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at D7 (reporting that some physicians have become “vocal 
about the overuse of ‘interventional cardiology,’ a specialty involving invasive 
coronary treatments that have become lucrative for the hospitals and doctors who 
perform them”); Sarah Kliff, HCA Probe Shines Light on Heart Care: Many Cardiac 
Procedures Are Unnecessary, Risky and Costly, Studies Show, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2012, 
at A13 (“Inappropriate cardiac interventions occur so regularly that a term for it 
has been coined in the medical literature: ‘Oculostenotic reflex’ . . . .”); see also 
James C. Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in 
Orthopedic Surgery and Interventional Cardiology, 17 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e241, e243–
44 (2011) (“These procedures were highly profitable, with contribution margins 
per patient ranging from . . . 56% for angioplasty, [to] 44% for CRM [cardiac 
rhythm management] . . . .”). 
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has become more common as well.7 
Cardiologists also have made growing use of various implants 
designed to maintain regular beating of the heart, a category 
sometimes denominated as “cardiovascular implantable electronic 
devices” (CIEDs).8  Cardiologists who specialize in cardiac rhythm 
management (CRM) using CIEDs are called electrophysiologists.9 
Pacemakers go back more than half a century,10 and they 
combine two components: a pulse generator that produces 
rhythmic electrical signals and electrodes (commonly referred to as 
“leads”) that deliver those signals to the patient’s heart.11  Patients 
with an irregular or abnormally slow heart rate, which can 
predispose them to heart attack or at least cause inadequate 
oxygenation of tissues throughout the body, often can benefit from 
 
 7. See Matthew Perrone, FDA Weighs Heart Valve’s Risks in Considering Broader 
Use, WASH. POST, June 13, 2012, at A15 (reporting that approximately 50,000 
Americans undergo aortic valve replacement surgery each year). 
 8. See Bruce L. Wilkoff et al., HRS/EHRA Expert Consensus on the Monitoring of 
Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs): Description of Techniques, 
Indications, Personnel, Frequency and Ethical Considerations, 5 HEART RHYTHM 907, 908 
(2008).  See generally KIRK JEFFREY, MACHINES IN OUR HEARTS: THE CARDIAC 
PACEMAKER, THE IMPLANTABLE DEFIBRILLATOR, AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2001).  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification regulations include them 
alongside other “cardiovascular prosthetic devices.”  See Cardiovascular Devices; 
General Provisions, 45 Fed. Reg. 7904, 7906, 7939–47 (Feb. 5, 1980) (codified as 
amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870(D) (2012)).  Equipment that delivers electrical 
pulses through paddles applied to the skin rather than implanted leads gets 
lumped together with other “cardiovascular therapeutic devices.”  See id. at 7906, 
7967–70 (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870(F)). 
 9. See Lou-Anne M. Beauregard, Ethics in Electrophysiology: A Complaint from 
Palliative Care, 33 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 226 (2010); Gerald V. 
Naccarelli et al., Training in Specialized Electrophysiology, Cardiac Pacing, and 
Arrhythmia Management, 51 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 374 (2008); see also Jeptha P. 
Curtis et al., Association of Physician Certification and Outcomes Among Patients 
Receiving an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 301 JAMA 1661, 1669 (2009) 
(“Nonelectrophysiologists implant 29% of ICDs . . . .”); William G. Stevenson et al., 
Clinical Assessment and Management of Patients with Implanted Cardioverter-Defibrillators 
Presenting to Nonelectrophysiologists, 110 CIRCULATION 3866, 3867 (2004). 
 10. See Kirk Jeffrey & Victor Parsonnet, Cardiac Pacing, 1960–1985: A Quarter 
Century of Medical and Industrial Innovation, 97 CIRCULATION 1978 (1998).  Some 
authors use the acronym “PM” when referring to a pacemaker. 
 11. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3610, .3680 (2012); see also Classification of 
Permanent and Temporary Pacemaker Electrodes, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,379, 13,379–80 
(proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (discussing the different types of leads and the range of 
problems experienced with their use).  Other components include a polymeric 
mesh bag to hold an implanted pulse generator; external devices to program the 
pulse generator, analyze its function, and recharge the battery; and miscellaneous 
accessories.  See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3620–.3730. 
4
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a pacemaker.12  By inserting an extra lead, electrophysiologists can 
pace both the right ventricle and right atrium,13 and they also can 
use pacemakers for “cardiac resynchronization therapy” (CRT) to 
coordinate beating between the left and right ventricles.14  Battery 
life varies but generally averages close to a decade.15  External 
pacemakers exist as well, used for instance on a stopgap basis 
during routine surgery to guard against heart attack.16 
Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) first came into 
use during the early 1980s and are basically pulse generators with 
different programming than traditional pacemakers.17  Not unlike 
 
 12. See Fred M. Kusumoto & Nora Goldschlager, Medical Progress: Cardiac 
Pacing, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 89–92 (1996) (summarizing the various 
indications for pacemaker use). 
 13. See Jeffrey & Parsonnet, supra note 10, at 1985–86 (discussing “dual-
chamber” pacemakers); Kusumoto & Goldschlager, supra note 12, at 89 (noting 
the popularity of dual-chamber pacing); id. at 93–97 (explaining the different 
modes available with programmable pacemakers); see also Stéphane Rinfret et al., 
Cost-Effectiveness of Dual-Chamber Pacing Compared with Ventricular Pacing for Sinus 
Node Dysfunction, 111 CIRCULATION 165, 170–71 (2005). 
 14. See Joshua M. Hare, Editorial, Cardiac-Resynchronization Therapy for Heart 
Failure, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1903–04 (2002) (discussing “biventricular” 
pacemakers); see also John G.F. Cleland et al., The Effect of Cardiac Resynchronization 
on Morbidity and Mortality in Heart Failure, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1546 (2005); 
Graham Nichol et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy in Patients 
with Symptomatic Heart Failure, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 343, 343–44 (2004). 
 15. See Michael Kindermann et al., Longevity of Dual Chamber Pacemakers: Device 
and Patient Related Determinants, 24 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 810, 815 
(2001); Janet Moore, Longer-Life Pacemaker Approved, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 
4, 2007, at 1D (adding that St. Jude’s Zephyr can last 14 years); cf. Janek Senaratne 
et al., Pacemaker Longevity: Are We Getting What We Are Promised?, 29 PACING & 
CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1044, 1050–54 (2006) (finding that batteries last 
more than a year less on average than projected by manufacturers). 
 16. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3600, .5550. 
 17. See Michael Glikson & Paul A Friedman, The Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillator, 357 LANCET 1107 (2001); Zachary Goldberger & Rachel Lampert, 
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators: Expanding Indications and Technologies, 295 
JAMA 809, 813–14 (2006); see also Mark A. Hlatky et al., Evidence-Based Medicine and 
Policy: The Case of the Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, 24 HEALTH AFF. 42, 48 
(2005) (“The ICD field has evolved very quickly, and devices on the market today 
have much greater capabilities than those of only two or three years ago.”).  As 
described in the FDA’s classification regulation, implanted pulse generators 
“correct both intermittent and continuous cardiac rhythm disorders.  This device 
[class] may include triggered, inhibited, and asynchronous modes . . . .”  21 C.F.R. 
§ 870.3610(a); see also id. § 870.3680(b)(1) (providing that electrodes may be used 
to “transmit a pacing electrical stimulus from the pulse generator to the heart 
and/or to transmit the electrical signal of the heart to the pulse generator”).  
Nonetheless, because ICDs had not been marketed prior to enactment of the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.), manufacturers must secure full 
5
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the old paddle sets used to resuscitate patients in hospitals or at the 
scene of an accident,18 ICDs deliver an electrical jolt when they 
detect cardiac arrhythmias (fibrillation).19  In addition, ICDs may 
function as more traditional pacemakers and facilitate CRT as 
well.20  More familiar than external pacemakers, automated 
external defibrillators (AEDs) also have become commonplace.21 
LVADs represent the newest class of cardiac-assist devices, 
though they provide mechanical circulatory support rather than 
electrical assistance.22  Sometimes called partial artificial hearts,23 
 
premarket approval of these devices while most pacemakers still only need to go 
through an abbreviated premarket notification process to demonstrate 
“substantial equivalence” to a previously sold device.  See Barnaby J. Feder, Medical 
Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at C2.  The FDA 
recently amended its classification regulations to call for the filing of either a 
premarket approval application or a notice of completion of a product 
development protocol for certain pacemaker components.  See Effective Date of 
Requirement for Premarket Approval for a Pacemaker Programmer, 77 Fed. Reg. 
37,570 (June 22, 2012) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 870.3700); Effective Date of 
Requirement for Premarket Approval for an Implantable Pacemaker Pulse 
Generator, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,573 (June 22, 2012) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610). 
 18. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.5300. 
 19. See John P. DiMarco, Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators, 349 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1836, 1837–38 (2003); Fred M. Kusumoto & Nora Goldschlager, Device 
Therapy for Cardiac Arrhythmias, 287 JAMA 1848, 1850–51 (2002); Robert J. 
Myerburg, Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators After Myocardial Infarction, 359 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2008); see also Stevenson et al., supra note 9, at 3867 
(“Battery longevity is typically 4 to 7 years (dependent on use) . . . .”). 
 20. See Michael R. Bristow et al., Cardiac-Resynchronization Therapy with or 
Without an Implantable Defibrillator in Advanced Chronic Heart Failure, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2140, 2148–49 (2004); DiMarco, supra note 19, at 1838, 1842; Alan Kadish, 
Editorial, Prophylactic Defibrillator Implantation—Toward an Evidence-Based Approach, 
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 286 (2005). 
 21. See Lawrence Altman, Defibrillators for the Public Aid Survival, Study Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at A16 (noting that “the devices have become standard 
equipment in many airports, malls, convention centers and health clubs”); see also 
21 C.F.R. § 870.5310 (FDA classification regulation).  See generally Kevin M. 
Rodkey, Comment, Medical Technology Meets the Maryland General Assembly: A Case 
Study in Handling Advances in Automated External Defibrillator Technology, 12 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 81 (2009). 
 22. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.3545; Classification of Ventricular Bypass (Assist) 
Devices, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,370, 13,371 (proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 870) (noting that LVADs remained investigational at the time); Muriel 
R. Gillick, The Technological Imperative and the Battle for the Hearts of America, 50 
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 276 (2007) (recounting the history behind this device’s 
development); Piera Morlacchi & Richard R. Nelson, How Medical Practice Evolves: 
Learning to Treat Failing Hearts with an Implantable Device, 40 RES. POL’Y 511, 515–21 
(2011) (same).  Although less common, surgeons instead may implant right 
ventricular assist devices (RVADs) or biventricular assist devices (BiVADs). 
 23. Fully implanted total artificial hearts (TAHs) still await final FDA 
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they help to move blood from the left ventricle—one of the heart’s 
four chambers—into the aorta, which then circulates oxygenated 
blood throughout the body.  Originally, these mechanical pumps 
required bulky external power packs and tubing, and they only 
were meant to serve as a temporary “bridge” while a patient with 
congestive heart failure awaited an organ transplant.24  LVADs have 
worked well enough to become “destination” treatments,25 and 
newer versions utilize a turbine to promote continuous (rather 
than pulsatile) blood flow through the heart.26  Presently, these 
implanted devices must remain tethered to external controllers 
and power-packs, which patients may sling over their shoulders or 
wear around their waists on belts.27 
 
approval.  See David Jolly, An Artificial Heart Its Makers Say Could Be a Standard 
Replacement, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at B10 (reporting that the only FDA-
approved total artificial heart, SynCardia’s update of the Jarvik-7, “has been 
implanted in more than 800 patients as a bridge before transplant,” while 
Abiomed’s fully implantable device enjoys limited distribution under the agency’s 
“humanitarian use” exemption); Rob Stein, Artificial Heart Gets FDA Panel Approval; 
Device Is Interim Before Transplant, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A1 (noting that 
SynCardia’s device “could be used only in a hospital and would require patients to 
be tethered to a large console that powers and controls the heart”).  Unlike 
LVADs, TAH implantation necessitates the complete removal of the patient’s 
heart.  See Renée C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, “He Knows That Machine Is His 
Mortality”: Old and New Social and Cultural Patterns in the Clinical Trial of the AbioCor 
Artificial Heart, 47 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 74, 81–82 (2004). 
 24. See Richard Saltus, Artificial Heart Pumps Are Making a Comeback, BOS. 
GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1996, at C1; Ruth SoRelle, Spare Hearts: Bridges for the Heart, HOUS. 
CHRON., Oct. 13, 1997, at A1; Sally Squires, Putting Heart Failure on Hold: New 
Devices Keep Blood Flowing While Patients Wait for Transplants, WASH. POST, July 12, 
1994, at F9. 
 25. See Sally Brush et al., End-of-Life Decision Making and Implementation in 
Recipients of a Destination Left Ventricular Assist Device, 29 J. HEART & LUNG 
TRANSPLANTATION 1337, 1337–38 (2010); James C. Fang, Editorial, Rise of the 
Machines—Left Ventricular Assist Devices as Permanent Therapy for Advanced Heart 
Failure, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2283 (2009); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pump Extends 
Lives, and Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at F1.  In some cases, an LVAD 
allows a patient’s heart to recover sufficiently so that the device can be explanted. 
 26. See Farooq H. Sheikh & Stuart D. Russell, HeartMate® II Continuous-Flow 
Left Ventricular Assist System, 8 EXPERT REV. MED. DEVICES 11 (2011); Mark S. 
Slaughter et al., Advanced Heart Failure Treated with Continuous-Flow Left Ventricular 
Assist Device, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2241, 2242, 2244 fig.1, 2249–50 (2009); Daniel 
Timms, A Review of Clinical Ventricular Assist Devices, 33 MED. ENGINEERING & PHYSICS 
1041 (2011) (comparing different models). 
 27. See Yukihiko Nosé et al., Editorial, The Need to Change Our Objective for 
Artificial Heart Development: From Totally Implantable Permanent Ventricular Assist 
Devices to Wearable Therapeutic Ventricular Assist Devices, 34 ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 1069 
(2010); Joseph G. Rogers et al., Continuous Flow Left Ventricular Assist Device Improves 
Functional Capacity and Quality of Life of Advanced Heart Failure Patients, 55 J. AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 1826, 1827 fig.1 (2010); see also Kiyo Fukamachi & Nicholas Smedira, 
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As with angioplasty, hospitals and clinics have found CIEDs to 
be a lucrative source of income.28  Some critics have complained 
about the inappropriate overuse of such devices—for instance, 
cardiologists have implanted ICDs in patients who do not really 
need them or in patients who may need them but suffer from other 
conditions that make these patients poor candidates for surgery.29  
Increasingly, recipients have shorter life expectancies than the 
batteries in their devices.30  The expanding utilization of these 
 
Smaller, Safer, Totally Implantable LVADs: Fact or Fantasy?, ACC CURRENT J. REV., Aug. 
2005, at 40, 42 (“Presently, no continuous-flow pump undergoing a clinical trial is 
completely implantable, but all are designed for easy conversion of the next-
generation model to total implantability.”); cf. Raja Mishra, Abiomed Poised to Tap 
Wider Market as Artificial Heart Faces Crucial Tests, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2003, at D1 
(“Patients [with fully implanted TAHs] wear batteries in belt pack that transfers 
energy to the heart via radio waves.  No tubes or wires run in and out of 
patients.”). 
 28. See Chunliu Zhan et al., Cardiac Device Implantation in the United States from 
1997 Through 2004: A Population-based Analysis, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 
13, 16 (2008) (“[P]atient admissions for cardiac device procedures might be more 
profitable than other hospital admissions.”); Barry Meier, Sales Tactics on Implants 
Raise Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at B1; see also Paul A. Heidenreich et al., 
Forecasting the Future of Cardiovascular Disease in the United States: A Policy Statement 
from the American Heart Association, 123 CIRCULATION 933, 935 tbl.2 (2011) 
(estimating over $60 billion in current annual expenditures on care of coronary 
heart disease and heart failure). 
 29. See Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the 
United States, 305 JAMA 43, 47 (2011) (finding a rate of inappropriate use 
exceeding twenty-two percent); Denise Grady, Many Defibrillators Called Unneeded, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A12.  But see Douglas L. Packer et al., ICDs: Evidence, 
Guidelines and Glitches, 8 HEART RHYTHM 800 (2011) (responding to the study by Al-
Khatib et al.). 
 30. See Anemona Hartocollis, Rise Seen in Medical Efforts to Improve Very Long 
Lives, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at A1 (highlighting the case of a 104-year-old 
patient who had received an ICD combined with a biventricular pacemaker five 
years earlier); see also Raymond Cutro et al., Device Therapy in Patients with Heart 
Failure and Advanced Age: Too Much Too Late?, 155 INT’L J. CARDIOLOGY 52, 52 
(2012) (“[O]ver 40% of all new ICD and CRT implants [in the United States] are 
in patients over the age of 70, and 10–20% are in patients over 80 years of age.”); 
Sharon R. Kaufman et al., Ironic Technology: Old Age and the Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillator in US Health Care, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 6 (2011) (focusing on use in 
octogenarians); Ure Mezu, Effectiveness of Implantable Defibrillators in Octogenarians 
and Nonagenarians for Primary Prevention of Sudden Cardiac Death, 108 AM. J. 
CARDIOLOGY 718, 721 (2011) (“Given the increased probability of death from 
competing causes in elderly patients, patients older than a certain age cease to 
extract a survival benefit from an ICD.”).  Cardiac-assist devices occasionally get 
used in much younger patients.  See Janet Moore, Vital Companions: Because They’re 
Not Just “Little Adults,” Children with Medical Devices Pose Unique Challenges, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 3, 2006, at 1D (describing a special camp for children with 
heart disease, adding that “many are alive today because they were implanted with 
pacemakers, defibrillators, valves and other devices”); Ron Winslow, Heart Beat: A 
8
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devices in elderly patients has, of course, depended heavily on 
coverage under Medicare.31 
III. MEDICAL ETHICISTS FRAME THE DEBATE 
Ethical questions associated with requests to deactivate 
implanted cardiac-assist devices have drawn sustained attention 
from clinicians.32  As explained more fully below, the articles 
published to date generally defend the practice.  The medical 
literature also contains several surveys of various individuals’ 
attitudes about CIED deactivation that document different parties’ 
perspectives in order to help inform the ethical debate, including 
the views of patients,33 health care professionals,34 and 
 
New Heart Pump, Just for Kids, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2011, at D1. 
 31. See Mark B. McClellan & Sean R. Tunis, Medicare Coverage of ICDs, 352 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 222, 222 (2005) (summarizing the gradual expansion in coverage that 
has occurred since 1986). 
 32. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Ballentine, Pacemaker and Defibrillator Deactivation in 
Competent Hospice Patients: An Ethical Consideration, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE 
MED. 14 (2005); Lofty L. Basta, End-of-Life and Other Ethical Issues Related to 
Pacemaker and Defibrillator Use in the Elderly, 15 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 114, 
116 (2006); Juan Pablo Beca et al., Deactivating Cardiac Pacemakers and Implantable 
Cardioverter Defibrillators in Terminally Ill Patients, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 236 (2009); Nathan E. Goldstein & Joanne Lynn, Trajectory of End-Stage 
Heart Failure: The Influence of Technology and Implications for Policy Change, 49 PERSP. 
BIOLOGY & MED. 10, 14–15 (2006); James N. Kirkpatrick & Antony Y. Kim, Ethical 
Issues in Heart Failure: Overview of an Emerging Need, 49 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 1, 6 
(2006); Hannah I. Lipman, Deactivation of Advanced Lifesaving Technologies, 16 AM. J. 
GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 109, 110 (2007); see also James N. Kirkpatrick et al., Medical 
Ethics and the Art of Cardiovascular Medicine, 376 LANCET 508, 509 (2010) (“Device 
management at the end of life can be ethically complex.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Nathan E. Goldstein et al., “That’s Like an Act of Suicide”: Patients’ 
Attitudes Toward Deactivation of Implantable Defibrillators, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
(Supp. 1) 7, 11 (2008) (“[W]e found that patients were either unwilling or unable 
to engage in conversations about deactivation.”); James N. Kirkpatrick et al., 
Deactivation of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators in Terminal Illness and End of Life 
Care, 109 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 91, 93–94 (2012); Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ethical and 
Legal Views Regarding Deactivation of Cardiac Implantable Electrical Devices in Patients 
with Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy, 107 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1071, 1074 (2011) (“Even 
this highly-educated cohort expressed substantial uncertainty and confusion about 
the legal status of CIED deactivation, and more than half could not identify 
whether variables such as the presence of a terminal illness were required for a 
device to be deactivated.”); Claire E. Raphael et al., Implantable Cardioverter-
Defibrillator Recipient Attitudes Towards Device Deactivation: How Much Do Patients Want 
to Know?, 34 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1628 (2011); Patricia H. 
Strachan et al., Patients’ Perspectives on End-of-Life Issues and Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillators, 27 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 6, 9–10 (2011). 
 34. See, e.g., Nathan E. Goldstein et al., “It’s Like Crossing a Bridge”: Complexities 
Preventing Physicians from Discussing Deactivation of Implantable Defibrillators at the End 
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representatives of device manufacturers.35 
A. ICDs and Such 
Timothy Quill, a general practitioner and professor of 
medicine and psychiatry at the University of Rochester, became 
one of the first persons to pen an article about this problem in a 
medical journal.  Dr. Quill, perhaps best known as the name 
plaintiff in one of the physician-assisted suicide cases to reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court,36 co-authored a defense of ICD deactivation in 
1994.37  This brief article started by offering a first-of-its-kind case 
study of a patient requesting that his ICD, which had fired 
regularly, get turned off.38  The authors then simply assumed that 
 
of Life, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 2 (2008); Paul J. Hauptman et al., 
Physician Attitudes Toward End-Stage Heart Failure: A National Survey, 121 AM. J. MED. 
127, 131 (2008) (“[D]iscussions with patients and families about potential device 
deactivation are very uncommon across all physician specialties.”); Amy S. Kelley et 
al., Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Deactivation at the End of Life: A Physician 
Survey, 157 AM. HEART J. 702, 706–07 (2009); Daniel B. Kramer et al., “Just Because 
We Can Doesn’t Mean We Should”: Views of Nurses on Deactivation of Pacemakers and 
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators, 32 J. INTERVENTIONAL CARDIAC 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 243, 248–49 (2011); id. at 250 (“Our study offers additional 
evidence that health professionals view pacemakers and ICDs differently (from 
each other and from other life-sustaining therapies).”); Laura J. Morrison et al., 
Managing Cardiac Devices Near the End of Life: A Survey of Hospice and Palliative Care 
Providers, 27 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 545, 548–49 (2010). 
 35. See Paul S. Mueller et al., “I Felt Like the Angel of Death”: Role Conflicts and 
Moral Distress Among Allied Professionals Employed by the US Cardiovascular Implantable 
Electronic Device Industry, 32 J. INTERVENTIONAL CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 253, 
257–60 (2011) (finding significant involvement of industry employees in CIED 
deactivation requests). 
 36. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Quill v. 
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Jane Gross, Quiet 
Doctor Finds a Mission in Assisted Suicide Court Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at B1; see 
also infra notes 133–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision).  
Dr. Quill had made headlines a few years earlier after publishing an account about 
helping one of his patients commit suicide.  See Timothy E. Quill, Death and 
Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991); 
Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, § 1, at 1.  Jack Kevorkian, a retired Michigan pathologist, 
drew far less positive press after he began assisting people who wanted to commit 
suicide.  See Lawrence K. Altman, More Physicians Broach Forbidden Subject of 
Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at C3; John Schwartz, A Polarizing Figure in 
End-of-Life Debates, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at A21. 
 37. See Timothy E. Quill et al., Discontinuing an Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillator as a Life-Sustaining Treatment, 74 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 205 (1994). 
 38. See id. at 205; id. at 206 (“[W]e found no case reports in which an ICD was 
turned off for a patient who explicitly wanted to die.”); see also TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A 
MIDWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS: STORIES OF HEALING AND HARD CHOICES AT 
10
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the case did not differ from requests for the withdrawal of other 
life-sustaining treatments at the end of life,39 devoting the bulk of 
their article to proposing a set of guidelines for handling all such 
cases without mentioning any special features linked to ICDs.40  
Fourteen years later, Dr. Quill published an article that made a 
passing reference to deactivating LVADs, but again with an almost 
cavalier assumption of equivalence.41 
 
THE END OF LIFE 72–90 (1996) (elaborating on this case study).  It did not take 
long for other such case reports to appear in the literature.  See, e.g., Lofty Basta & 
Michael L. O’Neal, Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A 
Terminal/Dying Patient Endures Repeated Shocks from an Automatic Implantable 
Cardioverter Defibrillator Unit, 9 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 174, 175 (2000); Yuen 
Cheng Looi, Letter, And It Can Go On and On and On . . . , 31 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM 
MGMT. 1, 1–2 (2006) (focusing on some of the practical difficulties encountered in 
deactivating an ICD); Vinod Nambisan & David Chao, Dying and Defibrillation: A 
Shocking Experience, 18 PALLIATIVE MED. 482, 482–83 (2004) (same); Kenneth 
Plunkitt et al., Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A Patient 
Is Asking His Cardiologist to Deactivate an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Device in 
Order to Allow Him to Die, 7 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 43, 43–44 (1998). 
 39. See Quill et al., supra note 37, at 206 (“Discontinuation of other potentially 
life-sustaining medical interventions such as mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis, 
and artificial hydration and nutrition is widely reported and practiced.” (endnotes 
omitted)); id. (“As illustrated in the case presented, life-sustaining medical 
treatments can save and prolong meaningful life.  They are also capable of 
indefinitely prolonging a life filled with progressive suffering and loss, thereby 
prolonging an agonizing death.”); see also id. at 205 (“A competent patient . . . has 
the right to discontinue a treatment that has previously been initiated if it no 
longer meets the patient’s goals.”).  Subsequent commentators repeated this 
mistake.  See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Berger, The Ethics of Deactivating Implanted Cardioverter 
Defibrillators, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 631, 633 (2005); Plunkitt et al., supra note 
38, at 43–44; Samuel F. Sears et al., Quality of Death: Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillators and Proactive Care, 29 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 637, 641 
(2006); Debra Lynn-McHale Wiegand & Peggy G. Kalowes, Withdrawal of Cardiac 
Medications and Devices, 18 AACN ADVANCED CRITICAL CARE 415, 416, 419 (2007). 
 40. See Quill et al., supra note 37, at 206 (urging physicians confronting such 
cases to ensure that the patient’s request is rational and consistent, that the 
patient’s prognosis is reasonably clear, that the patient understands his 
alternatives, that depression has been excluded, that specific plans be made for 
post-withdrawal palliative care, and that a second opinion be obtained). 
 41. See Timothy E. Quill, Physician-Assisted Death in the United States: Are the 
Existing “Last Resorts” Enough?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 17, 19 
(“These [life-sustaining] technologies no longer just mean ventilators and feeding 
tubes; they now include radical technologies such as ventricular-assist devices.  But 
while the array of medical choices faced by patients and families has grown more 
complex, ethics and law remain clear that patients have a right both to forgo such 
treatments and to stop them once started.”); see also id. at 18 (prefacing this as a 
“widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial” option); Brad Stuart, Letter, On 
Deactivating Cardiovascular Implanted Electronic Devices (CIEDs): Let Our People Go, 14 
J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1089, 1090 (2011) (“[E]ven patients who are completely device 
dependent, such as those on destination VAD therapy, should not be prohibited 
11
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The problem has gotten the most sustained attention from a 
group at the Mayo Clinic led by Paul Mueller.  Dr. Mueller and his 
associates first published an article in 2003 detailing half a dozen 
case studies involving requests to deactivate pacemakers or ICDs,42 
concluding—based in part on a citation to Dr. Quill’s 1994 
article—that such cases do not differ from other instances involving 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments.43  They elaborated on 
that conclusion somewhat by invoking causation and intent 
arguments previously used to justify the withdrawal of other forms 
of life-sustaining care at a patient’s request: “In PAS 
[physician-assisted suicide] and euthanasia, a new intervention is 
introduced (e.g., drug), the sole intent of which is the patient’s 
death.  In contrast, when a patient dies after an intervention is 
refused or withdrawn, the underlying disease is the cause of 
death.”44 
 
from discontinuing it, any more than they currently are from, say, discontinuing a 
ventilator.”). 
 42. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Analysis of Withdrawal of Pacemaker or 
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Support at the End of Life, 78 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
959, 959–61 (2003) (only one of the six cases involved an ICD). 
 43. See id. at 962 & n.9; see also id. at 963 (“Patients have the right to refuse any 
and all unwanted medical interventions or to request their withdrawal, including 
pacemakers and ICDs.”).  The authors conceded that new technologies might 
challenge the settled understandings of physicians and ethicists.  See id. at 962 
(“[A]s medical interventions become less invasive and more effective at 
prolonging life, . . . clinicians will continue to be challenged by ethical dilemmas 
involving terminally ill patients who have been treated with new technologies.”).  
They failed to consider, however, any peculiar features of CIEDs that might 
distinguish them from other life-sustaining treatments. 
 44. Id. at 962; see also id. at 963 (“Unlike PAS or euthanasia, which cause 
death via an externally implemented means, death after the refusal or withdrawal 
of unwanted interventions is caused by the patient’s underlying disease.”).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court had relied on just these factors in previously drawing such a 
line.  See infra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing 
these arguments); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the 
Courtroom: From Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco—A Brief History and 
Analysis of Constitutional Protection of the “Right to Die,” 278 JAMA 1523, 1527 (1997) 
(explaining that the Court’s “reasons for differentiating between the two practices 
fly in the face of a body of philosophic literature examining questions of causation 
and intention in medicine”); Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the 
Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1575–79 (2008) (same).  Even die-hard 
opponents of PAS recognize that this distinction cannot rest on grounds of 
causation and intent.  See Yale Kamisar, The “Right to Die”: On Drawing (and Erasing) 
Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 490–93, 519 n.163 (1996) (defending the distinction on 
other grounds); see also Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of 
Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1801–04 (2004) (applauding 
Professor Kamisar’s “intellectual honesty” in this regard). 
12
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Five years later, Dr. Mueller and his associates revisited the 
subject, reporting the results of a survey about the issue conducted 
among specialists in electrophysiology.45  Although finding 
somewhat greater discomfort among respondents in deactivating 
pacemakers as compared with ICDs,46 the authors emphasized that 
more than half of those surveyed saw such cases as 
indistinguishable from requests to withdraw other life-sustaining 
treatments such as artificial nutrition and hydration, dialysis, and 
ventilators,47 and they largely reiterated their prior arguments 
defending the practice based on intent and causation.48 
A couple of years later, the Mayo team published another 
survey, this time querying a somewhat broader range of medical 
professionals plus adding legal professionals and patients to the 
 
 45. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Deactivating Implanted Cardiac Devices in Terminally 
Ill Patients: Practices and Attitudes, 31 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 560 
(2008).  Among other things, they “found that requests to deactivate pacemakers 
and ICDs in terminally ill patients are common.”  Id. at 566. 
 46. See id. at 567 (“The practices and attitudes associated with pacemaker 
deactivation differ significantly from those associated with ICD deactivation.”); see 
also id. at 563 (“11.3% of the respondents described pacemaker deactivation in 
terminally ill patients as euthanasia, and 1.3% of the respondents described ICD 
deactivation as euthanasia (P < 0.001).  Similar numbers of respondents described 
device deactivation as physician-assisted suicide . . . .”); id. at 564 (“Among the 
respondents, 63.6% saw an ‘ethical or moral distinction between deactivating a 
pacemaker and deactivating an ICD’ in terminally ill patients.”); Mueller et al., 
supra note 35, at 257–60 (documenting similar views among industry personnel). 
 47. See Mueller et al., supra note 45, at 566 (“A majority of respondents did 
not distinguish between device deactivation and withholding or withdrawing other 
life-sustaining treatments in terminally ill patients.”).  Actually, in all but one of 
these comparisons, fewer than sixty percent of respondents took that position, see 
id. at 564, leaving a substantial minority thinking that CIEDs raise ethically 
meaningful differences.  For generally comparable findings in a survey of non-
electrophysiologists, see Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ethical and Legal Views of Physicians 
Regarding Deactivation of Cardiac Implantable Electrical Devices: A Quantitative 
Assessment, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1537, 1540 (2010) (“Notably, 25% to 49% of 
physicians considered deactivation of PMs and ICDs to be morally distinct from 
withdrawal of other life-sustaining therapies, and cessation of these devices was less 
frequently supported in clinical scenarios involving stable ambulatory patients with 
terminal illnesses.”); id. at 1541 (“Physicians characterized PM and ICD 
deactivation as physician-assisted suicide substantially more frequently than 
previously reported.”); Saadia Sherazi et al., Physicians’ Preferences and Attitudes 
About End-of-Life Care in Patients with an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 83 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 1139, 1140 (2008) (“Strikingly, nearly half of the physicians who were 
not cardiologists or electrophysiologists were uncertain about the legality of 
withdrawing ICD therapy in terminally ill patients.”). 
 48. See Mueller et al., supra note 45, at 566 (conceding, however, that, “if the 
intent of the [CIED] deactivation is to cause death of the patient, then 
deactivation could be characterized as euthanasia”). 
13
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mix.49  Again they found the respondents more comfortable with 
ICD as opposed to pacemaker deactivation.50  Perhaps because Dr. 
Mueller relinquished lead-author status on this article, however, 
their analysis of the underlying question showed some hints of 
equivocation.51  First, they noted that all of the available case law 
related to the withdrawal of “external” devices and treatments.52  
 
 49. See Suraj Kapa et al., Perspectives on Withdrawing Pacemaker and Implantable 
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Therapies at End of Life: Results of a Survey of Medical and Legal 
Professionals and Patients, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 981, 982 (2010); id. at 987 
(“Although several studies have focused on the attitudes of medical professionals 
regarding management of ICD therapy at the end of life, few have assessed 
attitudes regarding PMs, only 2 have looked at patient attitudes, and none have 
examined the attitudes of legal professionals.”).  Their idea of taking the pulse of 
the legal profession was to survey the faculty at five leading law schools!  See id. at 
982 (adding that they also had mailed questionnaires to judges but all declined to 
participate); id. at 989 (recognizing several possible limitations with this aspect of 
the survey, and conceding that “it is unclear if the sum of their individual opinions 
may be extrapolated to a more general legal opinion”). 
 50. See id. at 989 (finding “almost one-third of medical professionals 
perceiv[e] withdrawal of a PM as physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia and only 
1% believ[e] the same about an ICD”); id. (“[G]reater than one-third of 
respondents overall thought that withdrawing PM therapy in the PM-dependent 
patient was akin to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.”); cf. id. (“Legal 
professionals, however, tended to see few differences between withdrawal of ICDs 
and PMs, perhaps reflecting a different vantage point on the withdrawal of life-
sustaining therapies.  In fact, legal professionals most commonly thought that 
there was a lack of clarity in whether turning off an ICD or PM was legal.”). 
 51. See id. at 987; id. at 989 (“Although existing case law does not specifically 
focus on ICDs or PMs, extension of case law to these therapies generally supports 
their withdrawal when the patient requests it.”).  In contrast, Dr. Mueller stuck to 
his original guns in a commentary piece that he solo-authored that same year.  See 
Paul S. Mueller, Editorial, Clinicians’ Views Regarding Deactivation of Cardiovascular 
Implantable Electronic Devices in Seriously Ill Patients, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1543, 1544 
(2010) (emphasizing that “no treatment, including a CIED therapy, has unique 
moral status, i.e., must be continued once started”). 
 52. See Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 981 (“[D]ecisions on many externally 
provided life-sustaining therapies, including feeding tubes, mechanical ventilation, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest, and the 
administration of . . . external pacing, have typically favored the right of the 
patient or the surrogate decision maker to refuse and withdraw therapy.”).  They 
noted other differences as well: 
[M]ost legal cases have focused on withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies 
that are often more proximate to the end-of-life event (eg, intubation 
and mechanical ventilation, feeding tubes, and intravenous hydration) or 
visibly invasive (eg, hemodialysis).  Cardiac device therapies, such as ICDs 
and PMs, are unique in that they dwell within the patient’s body and, 
except in the case of an ICD shock, are often imperceptible to the 
patient. 
Id. at 987; see also id. at 981 (“[T]o our knowledge, no legal cases have focused on 
the legality of [implanted cardiac] device withdrawal.”). 
14
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Second, the authors conceded that certain patients cannot survive 
without their CIEDs.53  After repeating their previously made points 
about causation and intent,54 the authors focused on the “artificial” 
nature of CIEDs to buttress their sense that physicians who 
deactivated these devices upon a patient’s request had acted 
ethically.55 
B. Looking Beyond Simplistic Parallels 
Daniel Sulmasy offered a more nuanced treatment of ICD 
deactivation.56  At the outset, he suggested that the existing ethical 
defenses may have too quickly dismissed as unfounded the 
discomfort registered by clinicians and patients when queried 
about the matter, noting a “discrepancy between ethical analysis 
and clinical reality.”57  Indeed, Dr. Sulmasy wondered whether 
“there may be more going on here from a moral point of view than 
the ethics of the 1970s can handle,”58 echoing a theme sounded by 
 
 53. See id. at 988 (discussing pacemaker-dependent patients). 
 54. See id. at 987; see also id. at 988 (“[E]stablished case law holds that patients 
have the right to refuse or request the withdrawal of any treatment and has 
repeatedly held that no single treatment holds unique moral status, although no 
single case has focused specifically on management of ICDs and PMs at the end of 
life.”). 
 55. See id. at 988 (“[I]t is an artificial therapy that a patient can refuse or 
request the withdrawal of, just as a patient can refuse or request the withdrawal of 
mechanical ventilation.”).  The authors used the term “artificial” five times on this 
single page without explaining why this made all the difference.  See id. 
 56. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, Within You/Without You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and 
Ethics, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 69 (2008). 
 57. Id. (“Several previously published ethical analyses . . . have declared such 
misgivings to be misguided and have proceeded to analyze the discontinuation of 
ICD treatment using standard bioethical categories such as patients’ rights, refusal 
of unwanted therapy, autonomy, futility, and non-maleficence.”); see also id. 
(“[I]ssues long thought settled intellectually by ethicists, such as the difference 
between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, still present 
lingering doubts for patients and practitioners.”); id. at 70 (“[W]hat seems 
equivalent according to the logic of ethics continues to feel psychologically 
different to both patients and practitioners.”).  For instance, a small study of 
patient attitudes published alongside Sulmasy’s commentary had concluded that 
“ICDs are fundamentally different from other interventions that patients might 
receive at the end of life.”  Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 11 (“[P]atients appear 
to develop a complex psychological relationship with their ICD in a way unlike 
other interventions.  The devices provide a sense of security (‘like an insurance 
policy’ or like a trusted friend) and the very notion of removing them is ‘like an 
act of suicide.’”); id. (“Participants seem to have developed a symbiotic 
relationship with the device.  If the ICD is seen as a friend, then it is difficult for a 
patient to believe that the device could actually do them any harm.”). 
 58. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 69 (“As technology progresses, ethics must keep 
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his colleague Lynn Jansen a couple of years earlier.59  Jansen had 
proposed that one look at a device’s location,60 duration of use,61 
and functional role,62 but she hastened to add that such a 
framework would not invariably answer the core question of 
whether a treatment had become so much a part of a patient that a 
 
pace.”); id. at 69–70 (“As biotechnological progress marches forward, new 
interventions are challenging our notions about the difference between killing 
and allowing to die. . . .  [D]o new technologies, such as ICDs, require that the line 
between killing and allowing to die be redrawn?”); id. at 72 (“It is critically 
important . . . that we begin thinking seriously and carefully about what makes an 
intervention a part of the patient . . . .  The rapid pace of technological progress 
assures us that these sorts of questions will continue to surface in clinical 
practice.”). 
 59. See Lynn A. Jansen, Hastening Death and the Boundaries of the Self, 20 
BIOETHICS 105 (2006). 
With the advent of newer and better life-sustaining devices, some of 
which will be indwelling and some of which will consist of human tissue, 
we can expect greater uncertainty over the boundaries of the self in the 
future.  To grapple with the moral issues raised by this uncertainty, we 
will either need to revise our moral principles or learn to live with the 
unsettling possibility that they provide no guidance in these cases. 
Id. at 111; see also id. at 105 (“[I]n end-of-life contexts, when patients are receiving 
‘artificial’ life-support, judgments about where the person or self begins and where 
he or she ends can become controversial.  This can give rise to considerable 
uncertainty over whether a relevant moral principle applies or not.”). 
 60. See id. at 109 (“The fact that an object is under one’s skin does not settle 
the matter of whether it is a part of one’s self, but it is relevant to such a 
determination. . . .  [W]e are inclined to view objects that are within our bodies as 
part of us.”).  Initially, however, she largely had dismissed this factor as a critical 
line of demarcation.  See id. at 106 (“Whether an artificial life-sustaining device is 
internal or external to the body does not change the fact that it is an artificial life-
sustaining device.”); id. at 108–09 (“[T]he self cannot be defined by spatial 
boundaries.  Our selves are not identical with all that exists under our skins.  Some 
indwelling devices or growths are not part of us.”). 
 61. See id. at 109–10 (“The amount of time an object has existed within one’s 
body is relevant to determining whether it is a part of one’s self. . . .  If the 
pacemaker had been implanted only days or weeks before the illness, then the 
case for considering it to be a part of the patient’s self would be considerably 
weaker.”).  It might make more sense to view this factor as a question about 
relative permanence, no matter how much time may have elapsed in any 
particular case. 
 62. See id. at 110.  Jansen offered the following illustration to clarify what she 
meant by the third factor: 
If a child swallows a metal penny, and the penny stays inside him his 
entire life, we would not be inclined to view the penny as part of this 
person’s adult self.  But if the metal object is . . . a mechanical heart valve 
that functions to keep his heart pumping properly, then we will be much 
more inclined to view it as part of the self. 
Id.; see also id. at 107–08 (making a similar point about tumors). 
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physician could not withdraw it.63  Dr. Sulmasy considered—and 
largely rejected—each of these factors in turn before offering his 
own (though not altogether dissimilar) test. 
Sulmasy started by elaborating on a purported distinction 
between “regulative” therapies (namely, those that “coax the body 
back toward its own homeostatic equilibrium,” such as ICDs) and 
“constitutive” therapies (namely, those that “take over a function 
that the body can no longer provide for itself,” such as 
pacemakers).64  Although conceding that discontinuation would 
“raise more questions” in connection with constitutive rather than 
regulative therapies,65 ultimately he concluded that it should make 
no ethical difference.66 
Next, Sulmasy wondered about an internal/external 
distinction: “Does the fact that many new medical technologies are 
inside the body mean that they have thereby become part of the 
person so that deactivating an ICD or a pacemaker becomes 
morally equivalent to discontinuing the function of a natural heart 
by injecting [potassium chloride]?”67  He recognized that, under 
 
 63. See id. at 110 (“Factors such as spatial location, temporal duration and 
functional role, then, are relevant to the identification of the boundaries of the 
self. . . .  But these factors do not settle the matter in all cases.”).  Indeed, Jansen 
focused on pacemakers (rather than ICDs) and tentatively concluded (somewhat 
surprisingly given her framework, especially after also critiquing the common 
reliance on causation arguments) that it would not amount to active killing.  See id. 
at 106–07, 108, 110–11.  A different set of authors who focused on ICDs offered an 
intermediate position: such devices become sufficiently “integral” so that a 
physician could not unilaterally deactivate them on grounds of futility, but they 
are not so integral that a physician would have to decline a patient (or surrogate) 
request for deactivation.  See Ruth England et al., The Ethical and Legal Implications 
of Deactivating an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator in a Patient with Terminal 
Cancer, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 538, 539–40 (2007); see also infra note 170 (discussing 
futility). 
 64. See Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70; id. at 71 (“An ICD is regulative.  It does 
not supply the heart rhythm.  Rather, it shocks an abnormal cardiac rhythm back 
into normal sinus rhythm.”). 
 65. Id. at 70 (“Mimicking physiology, doing what the body no longer can do 
for itself, seems closer to being ‘a part of the patient’ than does a therapy that 
nudges the body into healing itself.”). 
 66. See id. (“[W]e still regularly accept the morality of discontinuing 
constitutive therapies such as ventilatory support.  The fact that a treatment is 
constitutive does not seem to mark a moral difference between killing and 
allowing to die.”).  He also dismissed duration-of-use as morally irrelevant.  See id. 
(noting that a request to withdraw ventilator support actually may deserve more 
serious consideration the longer that the patient has used it). 
 67. See id.  Others have noted perceptual differences that result.  See Goldstein 
et al., supra note 34, at 5 (“Both hemodialysis and ventilator support also require 
large machinery, which creates a physical reminder that advanced technologies 
17
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conventional approaches, “deactivating an external pacemaker is 
morally equivalent to deactivating an internal pacemaker, and 
deactivating an external defibrillator is morally equivalent to 
discontinuing an ICD.”68  Even though he conceded that a heart 
transplant patient would have no right to demand withdrawal of 
that treatment, Sulmasy rejected the internal/external divide on 
the strength of little more than a straw man argument.69 
Having largely dismissed the factors emphasized by Professor 
Jansen,70 Dr. Sulmasy instead tentatively suggested that only a 
subset of what he had called “constitutive” therapies might become 
sufficiently integral to a patient that their withdrawal would amount 
to physician aid in dying: treatments that fully “replace” (as 
opposed to simply “substitute” for) a diseased function.71 
 
are being used to sustain life. . . .  Because the ICD is so small and innocuous, its 
size does not create a daily interference with a patient’s quality of life . . . .”); see 
also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Highly invasive treatment may perpetuate human existence through 
a merger of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an insult to 
life rather than as its continuation.”). 
 68. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70–71; see also id. at 71 (“But is this correct?  
Does not having a device inside a patient make it a part of the patient, part of her 
physiology, so that stopping its function is killing?”). 
 69. See id. at 71.  Taking “internal” to mean “under the skin” (taking Jansen 
too literally), he imagined a severe burn victim with a skin graft who demands 
withdrawal of this “external” life-sustaining treatment.  See id. (“Most plastic 
surgeons would refuse to do this on the grounds that they would be mutilating, if 
not killing, the patient, even if she were otherwise dying from some other 
comorbid disease.”).  Sulmasy contrasted this situation with the following one, 
where he thought that physicians clearly should honor a request for withdrawal: 
an implant delivering a hormonal treatment to the site of prostate cancer.  See id.  
Although more clearly internal, I fail to see how that qualifies as life-sustaining. 
 70. See id. (“[W]hereas Jansen’s insight is correct—that some treatments must 
truly be considered within the ontological boundaries of the patient’s ‘self’—I do 
not think the criteria she has suggested fully capture the distinction.”). 
 71. See id. (offering this admittedly imprecise distinction as a “preliminary 
hypothesis,” and concluding that “the more an intervention can be understood as 
a replacement therapy, the less it seems morally appropriate to withdraw it”); id. at 
72 (“Whereas there is no absolute standard for judging whether something is a 
replacement or a substitute, the more clearly a technology can be classified as a 
replacement therapy, the greater the case for judging that its discontinuation 
would constitute an immoral act of killing.”).  Under his approach, “regulative” 
therapies such as ICDs would never cross the line.  See id. at 71 (“These 
interventions are distinct from the organism and extrinsic to its function, whether 
administered inside or outside the body.”); id. (“Regulatory therapies, no matter 
how sophisticated, and whether located inside the body or not, can be thought 
about just as one would think about withholding or withdrawing more standard 
forms of therapy at the end of life.”); id. at 72 (“[D]eactivating an ICD can be 
ethically distinguished from killing and considered a part of good palliative 
18
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What I mean by a replacement therapy is a technological 
intervention that participates in the organic unity of the 
patient as an organism. . . .  A replacement therapy is one 
that has become part of the patient’s restored physiology.  
The most important feature of a replacement therapy is 
that it provides the function that has been pathologically 
lost, more or less in the same manner in which the patient 
was once able to provide this function when healthy.72 
As potentially relevant factors, Sulmasy mentioned responsiveness 
to its surrounding environment, capacity for growth and self-repair, 
freedom from external power sources and expert control, 
immunologic compatibility, and physical integration into the 
body.73  After having subjected Jansen’s factors to a pointed 
rebuttal, however, Sulmasy never provided any account for why one 
or more of his factors should count in the ethical analysis—for 
 
care.”). 
 72. Id. at 71 (“Thus, for instance, a renal transplant is a replacement therapy, 
whereas peritoneal dialysis (although it also takes place inside the body) is a 
substitutive therapy.”).  His explanation for the ethical relevance of this distinction 
strikes me, however, as question-begging:  
Replacement therapies become part of the restored physiology of the 
patient, part of the integrated unity of the patient as an intact individual 
organism.  To discontinue such therapies is better understood as 
introducing a new lethal pathophysiological state rather than 
discontinuing a treatment that is merely substituting for a preexisting 
lethal pathophysiological lack of that function. 
Id. at 72. 
 73. Id. at 71–72.  He added that “[t]he paradigmatic replacement therapy is 
thus a well-functioning organ transplant from an identical twin,” id. at 72, but that 
is only because he made immunologic compatibility relevant—why exactly would it 
raise less serious ethical concerns to discontinue an organ transplanted from an 
unrelated donor that required more aggressive immunosuppression?  Would an 
artificial version of the same organ get pluses for immunologic compatibility to 
offset minuses for an inability for growth and self-repair?  Although Sulmasy 
repeatedly emphasizes that he envisions a sliding scale without any “bright line” or 
indispensable factors, see id. at 71–72, he still needs to provide some account for 
why (and how much) one or more of these factors count in the ethical calculus, cf. 
id. at 72 (“[T]his conclusion will doubtless prove challenging for persons 
unaccustomed to philosophical thinking.”).  Sulmasy closed by offering an 
extended illustration of the difference he had in mind: a diabetic patient receiving 
either insulin injections (clearly a “substitution” therapy that could be withdrawn 
at the end of life) or islet cell transplantation (clearly a “replacement” therapy that 
could not be destroyed by injecting streptozosin).  See id.  To use a harder case 
between these two extremes that comes closer to the CIED deactivation question, 
what about an implanted insulin pump, which in the near future may become fully 
automated?  See Natasha Singer, Insulin Dose More Finely Calculated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2010, at B1; “Artificial Pancreas” Shows Real Promise, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 26, 
2011, at A6. 
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instance, why exactly would fully implanted mechanical 
replacement organs not make the cut (is he relying on a 
natural/artificial distinction that others have rejected)?74  Although 
he never said so explicitly (and sought mainly to defend ICD 
deactivation), Sulmasy evidently would exclude pacemakers and 
LVADs as well.75 
C. Peculiarities of Pacemakers and LVADs 
Requests for pacemaker deactivation appear to pose trickier 
ethical questions.76  First, unlike ICDs that may fire repeatedly in 
dying patients (adding to their pain and distress),77 pacemakers 
 
 74. For instance, FDA officials have rejected the natural/artificial distinction 
in regulating medical devices.  See Ala. Tissue Ctr. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 378 
(7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing a challenge to the agency’s decision to treat heart valve 
allografts as devices); see also 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271 (2012) (outlining the FDA’s 
approach to human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products).  For 
more general flaws with the natural/artificial distinction, see Jansen, supra note 59, 
at 107 (concluding that instead it is “the distinction between what is a component 
of the self and what is alien or extrinsic to the self”); Robert D. Truog & Thomas I. 
Cochrane, Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: Irrelevance of the “Artificial” vs “Natural” 
Distinction, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2574, 2575–76 (2005). 
 75. In contrast, one pair of commentators used Sulmasy’s framework to argue 
that pacemaker deactivation in pacemaker-dependent patients would differ from 
the permissible deactivation of ICDs.  See G. Neal Kay & Gregory T. Bittner, 
Deactivating Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators and Permanent Pacemakers in Patients 
with Terminal Illness: An Ethical Distinction, 2 CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA & 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 336, 338 (2009).  But see Richard A. Zellner et al., Deactivating 
Permanent Pacemaker in Patients with Terminal Illness: Patient Autonomy Is Paramount, 2 
CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 340, 342 (2009) (“Using 
Sulmasy’s criteria, if an ICD is substitutive, with its continuous sensing capacity, so 
too is a pacemaker. . . .  Implanting the device under the skin does not change the 
nature of the device, only its location.  Like pacemakers, [LVADs] are likely to 
become internalized.”). 
 76. See Ron Shasby et al., Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac 
Patients: A Family Member with Power of Attorney for an 87 Year Old Patient Is Requesting 
Removal of the Patient’s Pacemaker, 7 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 48 (1998); Case 
Study, Retiring the Pacemaker, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 24 (focusing 
on collateral issues); see also Tia P. Powell, Life Imitates Work, 305 JAMA 542 (2011) 
(offering a bioethicist’s first-hand account of struggling over whether to consent to 
the implantation of a pacemaker in her cognitively impaired mother); Katy Butler, 
My Father’s Broken Heart, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 2010, at 38 (offering a personal 
perspective after a frail parent received a pacemaker). 
 77. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Management of Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillators in End-of-Life Care, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 835, 836 (2004) (finding 
that more than a quarter of dying patients received ICD shocks during their last 
month); id. at 837 (reporting that “the next of kin found it distressing to witness 
the patient being shocked at the end of life”); William R. Lewis et al., Withdrawing 
Implantable Defibrillator Shock Therapy in Terminally Ill Patients, 119 AM. J. MED. 892, 
20
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generally continue to function unnoticed, maintaining a steady 
cardiac rhythm.  Thus, pacemakers in no way interfere with the 
dying process apart from possibly prolonging it.78  Second, 
pacemakers are not as easily deactivated as ICDs—health care 
personnel cannot simply shut them off with a programming device 
or a strong magnet.79  Instead, the programmer must dramatically 
reduce the pacing rate and voltage.80  Third, unlike recipients of 
ICDs that may never fire (making their deactivation of little 
practical consequence),81 some patients become pacemaker-
dependent,82 leading a few commentators to view deactivation in 
such cases as amounting to active euthanasia.83  Although these 
 
892–93, 895 (2006); Michelle A. Mullen & Robert M. Gow, Understanding Ethical 
Issues, ICD, and DNR Orders: An Obstacle to Imminent Death?, 7 HEART RHYTHM 858, 
859 (2010) (“[R]epeated discharges of the ICD can dramatically exacerbate 
suffering during the dying process.”). 
 78. See Jill A. Rhymes et al., Withdrawing Very Low-Burden Interventions in 
Chronically Ill Patients, 283 JAMA 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[T]here is no clinically 
significant iatrogenic burden in allowing the pacemaker to continue to 
function.”); see also Beca et al., supra note 32, at 237 (“[T]he patient’s agony was 
extended for more than a week only by the pacemaker’s action. . . .  [T]he 
presence of a [pacemaker] can actually postpone death.”). 
 79. See Michael Thomas Beets & Edward Forringer, Urgent Implantable 
Cardioverter Defibrillator Deactivation by Unconventional Means, 42 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM 
MGMT. 941, 945 (2011); Stein, Devices Can Interfere, supra note 2, at A1 (“Large, 
specialized doughnut-shaped magnets can disable ICDs in an emergency.  And 
programming devices can permanently deactivate ICDs wirelessly.”). 
 80. See Ted C. Braun et al., Cardiac Pacemakers and Implantable Defibrillators in 
Terminal Care, 18 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 126, 127 (1999); Wilkoff et al., supra 
note 8, at 919–20.  Conversely, ICDs need not get shut off completely.  See James E. 
Russo, Deactivation of ICDs at the End of Life: A Systematic Review of Clinical Practices 
and Provider and Patient Attitudes, AM. J. NURSING, Oct. 2011, at 26, 33 (noting that 
intermediate options exist for reprogramming ICDs, “such as lengthening the 
detection interval, limiting the number of shocks, or deactivating the shock 
function while retaining antitachycardia pacing”). 
 81. See Goldstein et al., supra note 34, at 5 (“The interval between ICD 
deactivation and patient death may be much longer [than happens upon the 
withdrawal of hemodialysis or ventilators] given the unpredictable nature of 
malignant arrhythmias.”); see also Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70 (“[T]he very fact 
that it functions only intermittently might make it psychologically easier to 
deactivate an ICD than to deactivate the pacemaker of a patient with complete 
heart block.”). 
 82. See Classification of Implantable Pacemaker Pulse Generators, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 13,373, 13,373 (proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870) 
(noting that “patients may be totally dependent upon this device for their 
continued survival”); Panagiotis Korantzopoulos et al., Pacemaker Dependency After 
Implantation of Electrophysiological Devices, 11 EUROPACE 1151, 1154 (2009) 
(“Pacemaker dependency is observed in an appreciable number of paced patients 
after implantation . . . .”). 
 83. See Basta, supra note 32, at 116 (An ICD may be inactivated at the end-of-
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features explain why some clinicians hesitate when pacemaker 
patients request device withdrawal, most ethicists view these 
differences as inconsequential and would allow for pacemaker 
deactivation on the same grounds as ICD deactivation.84 
Only rarely have ethicists given LVADs more than passing 
attention.  As Dr. Quill had done before him,85 Dr. Mueller 
extended his defense of ICD deactivation to such implanted heart 
pumps.86  In 2008, a brief case study published in the Hastings Center 
Report—a prominent bioethics journal—provided the competing 
views of Jeremy Simon and Ruth Fischbach.87  Dr. Simon thought it 
 
life because it “may interfere with the natural process of dying peacefully.  
However, this is not true with a pacemaker, since it is considered to have become 
an integral part of the heart.  Therefore, changing pacemaker parameters to 
hasten the patient’s death is a form of euthanasia . . . .”); Lofty L. Basta, Ethical 
Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A Patient Asks to Put an End to the 
Nightmare of Living with a Lifesaving AIDC, 11 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 326, 327 
(2002) (“In a pacemaker-dependent patient, disabling or removing the pacemaker 
represents an active intervention, the intent of which is to cause death.”); Lofty L. 
Basta, Reply to Letter to the Editor, When Is Deactivation of Artificial Pacing and 
AICD Illegal, Immoral, and Unethical?, 12 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 275, 275–76 
(2003) (elaborating); Kay & Bittner, supra note 75, at 338. 
 84. See Ballentine, supra note 32, at 18; Beca et al., supra note 32, at 239 (“If 
the [pacemaker] sustains the patient’s life by means of an artificial cardiac rhythm, 
its deactivation should be considered just a way to avoid therapeutic obstinacy, not 
a way to cause death.”); Berger, supra note 39, at 631 (“[T]he ethical 
considerations in decisions to deactivate ICDs may similarly apply to . . . 
pacemakers.”); Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 988; Rachel Lampert & David Hayes, 
Letter, Pacemakers and End-of-Life Decisions, 305 JAMA 1858 (2011); Mueller et al., 
supra note 45, at 566; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: A Moral Algorithm, 283 JAMA 1065, 1067 (2000); Rhymes et al., supra 
note 78, at 1063 (“[D]eactivating this patient’s pacemaker is not killing in the 
sense of introducing a new pathology that causes death.”); Jeffrey Spike, 
Commentary, Retiring the Pacemaker, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 25, 
26 (“[A] pacemaker is more like an implantable defibrillator than any other 
medical device, and turning that off should be as acceptable as signing a DNR [Do 
Not Resuscitate] (or a DNAR, Do Not Attempt Resuscitation) order since they are 
functionally and ethically isomorphic.”); Sandra N. Whitlock et al., Is Pacemaker 
Deactivation at the End of Life Unique?: A Case Study and Ethical Analysis, 14 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 1184, 1185–87 (2011); Wiegand & Kalowes, supra note 39, at 421–
22; Zellner et al., supra note 75, at 341–43. 
 85. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Analysis of Withdrawing Ventricular Assist 
Device Support, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 791, 795–97 (2010) (discussing causation, 
intent, and similarity to withdrawal of ventilators).  Unlike Quill, these authors had 
reviewed several case studies in detail, and they did recognize that LVADs 
appeared to raise some special concerns before dismissing these as ethically 
irrelevant.  See id. at 794–95. 
 87. Case Study, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,” HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 14 (including commentaries by Jeremy Simon and Ruth 
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“tantamount to removing the patient’s heart.”88  Although 
cognizant of the limitations in drawing this parallel,89 he focused on 
the functional similarities between such a mechanical implant and 
a transplanted organ insofar as both become “integrated” in 
patients so that they then can function independently.90  Professor 
Fischbach dismissed Dr. Simon’s effort to equate LVADs with 
transplanted organs,91 emphasizing instead the device’s similarities 
 
Fischbach, both of whom now serve on the medical school faculty at Columbia 
University).  Five years earlier, a similar exchange (though focused on TAHs 
rather than LVADs) had appeared in the pages of the wonderfully obscure journal 
Death Studies.  Compare Robert M. Veatch, Inactivating a Total Artificial Heart: Special 
Moral Problems, 27 DEATH STUD. 305, 307–10 (2003) (expressing some 
reservations), with Katrina A. Bramstedt, Replying to Veatch’s Concerns: Special Moral 
Problems with Total Artificial Heart Inactivation, 27 DEATH STUD. 317, 318–19 (2003) 
(defending deactivation), and Katrina A. Bramstedt, Elective Inactivation of Total 
Artificial Heart Technology in Non-Futile Situations: Inpatients, Outpatients and Research 
Participants, 28 DEATH STUD. 423, 427–29 (2004) (same). 
 88. Jeremy R. Simon, Commentary, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,” 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 14, 15; see also id. at 14 (“We would not 
remove a patient’s biological heart, transplanted or native, simply because the 
patient was suffering greatly from heart failure and did not want to go on; nor 
should we disable his LVAD.”). 
 89. See id. at 14 (“Although LVADs are neither fully implantable nor a full 
replacement for a heart, they share many ethically relevant features with true 
artificial organs.”).  The hypothetical case had stipulated that “many of the 
device’s controls, as well as its power source (a rechargeable battery), are outside 
the patient and connected to the pump by tubes and wires that pass through the 
patient’s abdominal wall.”  Id.  These differences added to Dr. Simon’s misgivings 
insofar as they meant that an ambulatory patient could have disconnected the 
device himself—and the patient’s evident discomfort with doing so suggested that 
he viewed deactivation as suicide.  See id. at 15 (“The fact that the patient does not 
want to take action on his own, however, does not authorize others to hasten his 
death for him.”); id. (adding that the physician who declines to assist should 
“perhaps make it clear to [the patient] that he has the means to do so himself”).  
This aspect of the hypothetical would, of course, fall away if the patient could not 
act on his own or in the case of a fully implantable device. 
 90. Id. at 14 (“The fact that the LVAD is manufactured and partially external 
is less important than the fact that it forms an integrated part of an independently 
functioning organism.”); see also id. (“Once the patient leaves the hospital, the 
LVAD ceases to be a medical treatment and becomes effectively part of the patient 
himself, much like a transplanted organ or even a native one.”); id. (calling the 
LVAD cases a “harbinger . . . of a much larger group [of patients] we will 
undoubtedly soon encounter—those who have implanted artificial organs 
essential to their survival”). 
 91. See Ruth L. Fischbach, Commentary, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,” 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 15, 15 (“After an organ is implanted, it 
becomes part of the patient and its functioning is relatively independent.  
However, an LVAD is not itself a vital organ and requires external power, 
anticoagulation therapy, and consistent maintenance.”).  This entirely disregards 
the necessity for chronic use of antirejection drugs after organ transplantation.  See 
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to other forms of external life-sustaining treatments that physicians 
may withdraw under appropriate circumstances,92 and she added 
that its deactivation simply would allow a patient to die of natural 
causes.93 
D. Reaching a Consensus of Sorts 
Objections to the prevailing view appear only rarely in the 
literature.94  Recently, a pair of commentators took the position 
that, unless a patient faces imminent death from an unrelated 
cause (e.g., massive stroke or multiple organ failure), CIED 
deactivation qualifies as the cause of the patient’s demise and 
amounts to an unnatural (and, hence, impermissibly physician-
aided) death.95 
 
Alex Gutierrez-Dalmau & Josep M. Campistol, Immunosuppressive Therapy and 
Malignancy in Organ Transplant Recipients: A Systematic Review, 67 DRUGS 1167 
(2007). 
 92. See Fischbach, supra note 91, at 15 (“[T]he device is similar to other forms 
of advanced life support, such as ventilators, which are routinely discontinued in 
accordance with patients’ wishes in terminal extubation.”); id. (“Since the 
functioning of an LVAD depends on external power sources and pharmaceutical 
maintenance, removing those externalities is akin to the passive euthanasia that 
physicians already perform.”). 
 93. See id. (“If the LVAD is disabled, death will occur due to heart failure, not 
medical intervention—a consolation to one who opposes suicide.”); see also Stein, 
Heart Pump, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting Timothy W. Kirk, a bioethicist at 
Villanova University: “It is not assisted suicide or euthanasia [to deactivate an 
LVAD], because what’s killing them is the underlying disease.”).  But see id. 
(quoting James Kirkpatrick, a cardiologist and ethicist at the University of 
Pennsylvania: “This is unlike anything else we deactivate. . . .  When you turn off 
an LVAD, it can make the person worse.  You can basically worsen the heart 
function.  So you’re not just stopping something and letting nature take its 
course.”); Katrina A. Bramstedt & Neil S. Wenger, When Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Care Does More Than Allow Death to Take Its Course: The Dilemma of Left 
Ventricular Assist Devices, 20 J. HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 544, 545–46 (2001) 
(noting the possibilities of back flow, pooling, and regurgitant flow of blood as 
well as disruption of the heart’s contractility after deactivation); id. at 546 
(“[L]eaving an implanted and yet unpowered LVAD in place actually impedes 
natural heart function.”). 
 94. As mentioned previously, a distinct minority of commentators view device 
deactivation in pacemaker-dependent patients as active euthanasia.  See supra notes 
83–84 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Letter, When Is Deactivating 
an Implanted Cardiac Device Physician-Assisted Death? Appraisal of the Lethal 
Pathophysiology and Mode of Death, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1086, 1086–87 (2011).  
Critically, they did not view the underlying cardiovascular disease that necessitated 
CIED treatment as life-threatening insofar as patients view the “implanted devices 
as a permanent cure of their preexisting disease.”  Id. at 1086; see also id. 
(“[D]eactivating [CIEDs] in device-dependent patients sets off a lethal 
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For example, a pacemaker-dependent patient wishing to 
end his life asks his physician to assist with premedication 
and pacemaker deactivation for a rapid death.  The lethal 
pathophysiology is electric asystole and circulatory arrest 
brought about by pacemaker deactivation. . . .  However, 
deactivating the pacemaker in a similar patient after an 
acute brainstem infarction sustaining a lethal 
pathophysiology from apnea and pulselessness is not 
assisted death but natural death.96 
Their causation-focused analysis arguably proves too much, 
however, insofar as it seemingly also would bar withdrawing 
treatment from ventilator-dependent patients.97  Then again, 
perhaps it just demonstrates that this oft-invoked line of 
demarcation lacks coherence.98 
After fifteen years of debate in the medical literature, the views 
of those defending the ethics of CIED deactivation secured official 
endorsement in 2010.  The Heart Rhythm Society (HRS), along 
with half a dozen other professional groups (including the 
American College of Cardiology and the American Heart 
Association), produced a “consensus statement” covering the 
subject, with several of the individuals who previously had penned 
defenses of deactivation listed as co-authors.99  The report 
 
pathophysiology of its own causing death even in the absence of life-threatening 
illness. . . .  Having precise control over time, place, and method or mode of death 
qualifies it as assisting death.”). 
 96. Id. at 1087; see also id. (“In the absence of life-threatening illness, 
deactivating [CIEDs] that replace native cardiac function interrupts normal 
circulation and constitutes the new lethal pathophysiology (mode of death) in a 
device-dependent patient.”).  For a harsh response, see Stuart, supra note 41, at 
1089–90 (critiquing their position as almost heretical). 
 97. See infra notes 110–23 and accompanying text (discussing judicial analysis 
of such a case); see also Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Roger G. Spragg, Ethical 
Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984, 988 
(1988).  Indeed, this same pair of commentators previously had co-authored with 
others a paper about LVADs that treated deactivation as largely unremarkable.  See 
Aaron G. Rizzieri et al., Ethical Challenges with the Left Ventricular Assist Device as a 
Destination Therapy, 3 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. no. 20, at 10–12 (2008). 
 98. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very 
Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 446–62 (1997) (finding no meaningful 
differences between treatment withdrawals and assisted suicide).  For instance, 
Professor Orentlicher explained that “patients who die when treatment is 
withdrawn also die an unnatural death,” and he offered the following illustration 
(without, however, any further elaboration): “[W]hen a person has had an 
artificial heart valve or a cardiac pacemaker implanted, the patient is now at a new 
baseline in terms of her physical condition.”  Id. at 449. 
 99. See Rachel Lampert et al., HRS Expert Consensus Statement on the 
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emphasized the importance of improving dialogue about the 
question between physicians and their patients.100  Viewing the 
matter as no different than requests to withdraw other forms of life-
sustaining treatment,101 buttressed by the previously described 
points about causation and intent,102 the HRS consensus statement 
concluded as follows: “Deactivation of a CIED, whether a 
pacemaker, ICD or other device is not assisted suicide or 
euthanasia and is ethically and legally permissible.”103  In spite of 
the mildly remarkable confidence expressed in the report,104 an 
 
Management of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) in Patients Nearing 
End of Life or Requesting Withdrawal of Therapy, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1008 (2010); id. at 
1009 (“Agreement [among members of the expert panel] was greater than 90% 
on all recommendations.”); see also Luigi Padeletti et al., EHRA Expert Consensus 
Statement on the Management of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices in Patients 
Nearing End of Life or Requesting Withdrawal of Therapy, 12 EUROPACE 1480 (2010) 
(offering similar guidance from the European counterpart of HRS).  For a critical 
assessment of such consensus efforts, see Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: 
Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 373, 420–21 & n.204, 428–29 n.241 (2002). 
 100. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1013, 1015–19; see also Goldstein, supra 
note 77, at 837 (“[W]e found that clinicians rarely discuss deactivating ICDs with 
patients, even those patients who are perceived to be near death or those who had 
previously expressed a desire to limit life-prolonging therapy.”); id. 
(“Conversations about deactivation, as well as the actual turning off of the device, 
occurred not as decisions planned well in advance of the patient’s death but as 
reactions to distress in the days, hours, or minutes before the patient died.”).  The 
HRS report also outlined some of the logistics involved in the process of CIED 
deactivation.  See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1019–22. 
 101. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1009 (“The right to refuse or request 
the withdrawal of a treatment is a personal right of the patient and does not 
depend on the characteristics of the particular treatment involved (i.e., CIEDs).  
Therefore, no treatment, including CIED therapies, has unique ethical or legal 
status.”); id. at 1011 (“[T]here is no ethical or legal distinction between a 
treatment that’s integrated within the body, versus one which is outside the 
body.”). 
 102. See id. at 1009, 1011. 
 103. Id. at 1014.  Although framed broadly enough to cover LVADs, the report 
never once mentioned these devices, except as a possible alternative treatment to 
pacemakers or ICDs.  See id. at 1017 (“Patients with worsening congestive heart 
failure may be candidates for advanced therapies such as left ventricular assist 
devices or cardiac transplantation.”).  Two years earlier, a consensus statement co-
sponsored by HRS that focused on the monitoring of CIEDs had included a 
definition not covering LVADs.  See Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 908; see also id. at 
919–21 (previewing the ethical issues associated with CIED deactivation); Andrew 
E. Epstein et al., ACC/AHA/HRS 2008 Guidelines for Device-Based Therapy of Cardiac 
Rhythm Abnormalities, 117 CIRCULATION e350, e388–89 (2008) (same). 
 104. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1011 (“[T]he legal precedents and 
ethical principles are unambiguous—a patient has the right to refuse and request 
the withdrawal of CIED therapies regardless of whether s/he is terminally ill or 
26
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ethical consensus in favor of the practice informs but ultimately 
cannot settle questions about its legality.105 
IV. STRADDLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LINES 
For more than a quarter of a century, judges, legislators, and 
commentators have given end-of-life legal questions plenty of 
attention, but they have had essentially nothing to say about the 
deactivation of implanted cardiac-assist devices.  After summarizing 
the United States Supreme Court’s general guidance, which for the 
most part has left the matter to state legislation, I suggest some ways 
of addressing this unique problem. 
 
not, and regardless of whether . . . death would follow as a consequence of a 
decision not to use them.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1010 (“[E]ven though the 
Supreme Court has not specifically commented on the question of PM or ICD 
deactivation, because CIEDs deliver life-sustaining therapies, discontinuation of 
these therapies is clearly addressed by the above Supreme Court precedents 
upholding the right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.” (emphasis added)); 
see also id. at 1009 (“Because ethics and law are closely aligned, they are considered 
together in this section.”).  Subsequent commentators thereupon viewed the 
matter as settled, treating physicians or patients who expressed qualms about 
CIED deactivation as misguided.  See Kramer et al., supra note 47, at 1539 
(“Deficiencies in physicians’ legal knowledge were more pronounced for questions 
related to cardiac devices.”); id. at 1540–41 (citing the HRS guidelines for the 
proposition that “there is no meaningful distinction in the law or among ethicists 
regarding different life-sustaining therapies, such as mechanical ventilation, 
feeding tubes, dialysis, and cardiac devices”); Kramer et al., supra note 33, at 1073 
(“Widespread uncertainty was found [among patients] regarding the legal status 
of CIED deactivation . . . .”); id. at 1074 (citing, among other sources, the HRS 
guidelines for the proposition that “neither PM-dependence nor a patient’s 
prognosis influence the legality of device deactivation”). 
 105. See Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 987 (“The withdrawal of ICD therapy at 
the end of life . . . is generally thought to be ethically permissible.  However, the 
legality of this is not as clear, in part due to the lack of court cases focusing 
specifically on withdrawal of implantable cardiac device therapy.” (endnotes 
omitted)); see also Alan Meisel, The Legal Consensus About Forgoing Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: Its Status and Its Prospects, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 309, 314 (1992) 
(“[T]he law has been substantially influenced by the changing attitudes in clinical 
practice.  Clinical practice exists in an iterative relationship with the law, and vice-
versa.”).  For a scathing critique of legal interpretation undertaken by medical 
ethicists in a different context, see Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: 
Conscripting Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330, 342–66 (2010); id. 
at 355 (“[A]s an exercise in legal analysis, their defense of the CSP policy comes 
across as entirely amateurish.”).  Conversely, future judicial (or legislative) 
endorsement of CIED deactivation would hardly resolve any lingering ethical 
uncertainties about the practice.  See Jansen, supra note 59, at 111. 
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A. Tentative Judicial Guideposts 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health.106  The petitioner had sustained 
permanent brain damage that left her in a persistent vegetative 
state, and her parents went to court seeking permission to withdraw 
the gastrostomy tube that supplied life-sustaining nutrition and 
hydration.107  The high Court framed the question very narrowly, 
asking only whether the state could constitutionally require a 
surrogate decisionmaker to present “clear and convincing 
evidence” of Ms. Cruzan’s wishes in order to permit the withdrawal 
of treatment, and it concluded that this standard did not 
impermissibly infringe on the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interests.108  The Court had assumed for the sake of 
argument that patients enjoyed a constitutional right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.109 
Just six months after the decision in Cruzan, the Nevada 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in McKay v. Bergstedt.110  A 
ventilator-dependent quadriplegic had sought a judicial decree to 
facilitate his desire to remove the respirator.111  The trial judge 
ruled in the petitioner’s favor,112 and, while an appeal to the state’s 
highest court was pending, Kenneth Bergstedt died after his father 
disconnected the tracheostomy tube.113  Even though Kenneth’s 
demise rendered the case moot,114 the Nevada Supreme Court 
issued a lengthy opinion affirming the trial judge’s order. 
The majority in McKay accepted the district court’s findings 
 
 106. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 107. See id. at 266–68. 
 108. See id. at 280–87. 
 109. See id. at 279 (“[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”); id. at 287–89 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 110. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). 
 111. See id. at 620 (Petitioner sought “an order permitting the removal of his 
respirator by one who could also administer a sedative and thereby relieve the 
pain that would otherwise precede his demise.  [He] also sought an order of 
immunity from civil or criminal liability for anyone providing the requested 
assistance.”). 
 112. Judge OKs Quadriplegic’s Plea to Die, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1990, at A29. 
 113. Man in Court Case on Suicide Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at A6.  
Kenneth’s father died one week later of lung cancer.  Man Dies After Son Fulfilled 
Wish to End Life Before Him, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A29. 
 114. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 619–20 (adding that the Attorney General had 
made only a “token” effort on appeal). 
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that Kenneth was mentally competent and conceded that, while his 
near total paralysis was irreversible, he did not have any terminal 
illness—after suffering a childhood swimming accident, Kenneth 
had already lived more than two decades by virtue of the respirator 
and could expect to do so for several more decades.115  Given the 
impending death of his terminally ill father, who had served as sole 
caretaker during much of this time, Kenneth feared the prospect of 
long-term institutionalization and asked that medical personnel 
disconnect his ventilator and administer sedatives to blunt the 
sensation of resulting suffocation.116  The majority held that 
Kenneth enjoyed common law and constitutional rights to decline 
further treatment.117  It then carefully examined the state’s possible 
countervailing interests—in preserving life, preventing suicide, 
protecting third parties, preserving the integrity of the medical 
profession, and encouraging the charitable and humane care of 
persons with disabilities—before concluding that these did not 
outweigh Kenneth’s rights.118 
After complaining about the majority’s decision to issue what 
amounted to an advisory opinion in a case that the state had never 
actively opposed in any event,119 the dissenting judge in McKay 
disagreed with his colleagues’ characterization of the situation: 
[A]fter twenty-three years of living and breathing in this 
machine-aided manner, the whole process becomes 
something quite more than mere medical treatment.  The 
mechanical breather becomes a new way of life for its 
user, and life cannot go on without it.  Mr. Bergstedt lived 
at home.  The “treatment” in any real sense is over; and 
just as heart pace-makers, artificial venous or arterial shunts, 
 
 115. See id. at 620. 
 116. See id. at 620, 624–25; cf. Peter Applebome, Judge Rules Quadriplegic Can Be 
Allowed to End Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1989, at A16 (discussing a similar case from 
Georgia: “In a unique approach, [Larry] McAfee, a former civil engineer, helped a 
friend design a timing device he can activate with his mouth that would allow him 
to shut off his ventilator on his own.”); id. (“[H]e needed someone to administer a 
sedative so he could die quietly and not experience the terrifying, suffocating 
feeling that occurred when he briefly dislodged his ventilator.”). 
 117. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 621–22. 
 118. See id. at 622–28, 631–32; see also id. at 629–31 (recommending a more 
expeditious procedure for considering such petitions).  In its discussion of the 
state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession, see id. at 627–
28, the majority failed to consider the possibility that patient requests for medical 
assistance in discontinuing life-sustaining care might raise more serious problems 
than initial patient refusals of such care. 
 119. See id. at 632–33 (Springer, J., dissenting). 
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a variety of prosthetic devices and other such medically 
sponsored and introduced artifacts may begin as a medical 
treatment modality, the ventilator begins as a form of 
medical treatment but ends up as an integral part of its 
dependent user.120 
In effect, technological advances had turned previously fatal 
injuries and conditions into manageable medical problems, 
offering increasingly mundane (neither heroic nor extraordinary) 
interventions.121  The dissent also emphasized that disconnection of 
the ventilator would immediately and proximately cause the 
petitioner’s death, making his request more akin to seeking 
assistance in committing suicide, rather than that of a terminally ill 
patient who simply wants to die with dignity, adding that the 
majority’s mischaracterization allowed it to dodge the real and 
much harder question of whether to ever allow physician-assisted 
suicide.122 
 
 120. Id. at 634 (emphasis added); see also id. at 634 n.6, 635 (quoting the 
following statement from an amicus brief submitted by a disability rights 
organization even though the court had rejected it for filing as tardy: “Life support 
systems such as ventilators, electric wheelchairs, or other automated devices 
enhancing one’s functions are real extensions of the person . . . .”). 
 121. See id. at 636 (“[T]he technical ability to keep a person with these kinds of 
injuries alive by means of mechanical respiration has not been available for much 
more than fifty years.”); see also WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR 
RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA 67–69 (2006) (tracing the history of ventilators); id. at 
169 (“As medical technology began its advance in the 1970s, . . . pinning down 
exactly how this ordinary-extraordinary distinction should apply proved as elusive 
as defining what letting ‘nature take its course’ involved.”).  The majority 
recognized as much, though it held to a baseline that asked what prospects a 
patient would enjoy in the absence of these advances.  See McKay, 801 P.2d at 621 
(majority opinion) (“Because many individuals find themselves facing a terminal 
condition susceptible to indefinite suspension by medical intervention, the 
question arises with increasing frequency and fervor concerning the extent to 
which persons have the right to refuse an artificial extension of life.”); id. at 627. 
Unlike a person bent on suicide, Kenneth sought no affirmative 
measures to terminate his life; he desired only to eliminate the artificial 
barriers standing between him and the natural processes of life and 
death that would otherwise ensue with someone in his physical 
condition. . . .  [H]e asked no one to shorten the term of his natural life 
free of the respirator.  He sought no fatal potions to end life or hurry 
death.  In other words, Kenneth desired the right to die a natural death 
unimpeded by scientific contrivances. 
Id. at 625–26.  The majority repeatedly used terms such as “artificial” and “radical” 
to describe the interventions that had kept Kenneth alive. 
 122. See id. at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting) (“There was nothing natural about 
Mr. Bergstedt’s death; he killed himself.”); id. at 636–37 (considering the 
difficulties with recognition of such a right); id. at 637 (“We are not dealing here 
with ‘overtreatment’ or unwanted prolongation of the dying process.”). 
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Hypothetical variations of McKay might help to situate this 
decision relative to questions about deactivating implanted cardiac-
assist devices, which the next section takes up at greater length.  
Presumably, even the dissent would have allowed Kenneth 
Bergstedt—if injured as an adult (without dependents) and 
deemed competent at the time—to decline ventilator assistance 
from the outset notwithstanding the inevitability of death as a 
result.  Would it make any difference if, after initially consenting to 
use of such a device, Kenneth declined to replace it many years 
later when the original unit or tubing began to fail?123 
Conversely, even the majority would have rejected a request by 
Kenneth for medical assistance designed to halt respiration 
through the administration of drugs, a question that the United 
States Supreme Court would take up in due time.  So much for the 
extremes.  Now imagine that a technology existed—namely, an 
implanted pulmonary pacemaker—that allowed quadriplegics to 
regain lung function by artificially signaling the diaphragm,124 
thereby freeing them of the need for connection to an external 
ventilator; would the majority still allow Kenneth to receive medical 
assistance in shutting off (or explanting) such a device for the 
express purpose of allowing his original injury to run its course and 
cause a “natural death”?  If not, might a prognosis of impending 
death from other causes affect the analysis? 
Seven years after the decisions in Cruzan and McKay, the 
 
 123. The majority clearly thought not insofar as it regarded a request to 
disconnect as tantamount to declining (further) treatment.  See id. at 625 (majority 
opinion) (“[W]e see no difference between the patient who refuses treatment and 
the one who accepts treatment and later refuses its continuance because of a 
resulting loss in the quality of life.”); id. at 628 (“Because a competent adult would 
have enjoyed a qualified constitutional and common law right to refuse a life-
sustaining attachment to a respirator in the first instance, there is no reason why 
such an adult could not assert the same rights to reject a continuation of 
respirator-dependency that has proven too burdensome to endure.”); see also 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (asking about the “degree of intrusion and restraint”); In re Quinlan, 
355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (focusing on the extent of “bodily invasion,” which 
in that case included a respirator). 
 124. Pacemakers do exist for other parts of the body (primarily the brain and 
spinal cord), but currently these are merely used to help treat conditions such as 
Parkinson’s tremor, depression, or chronic pain rather than for life-sustaining 
purposes.  See Melissa Healy, Which Patients Benefit Most from Parkinson’s Implant?, 
BALT. SUN, Oct. 16, 2010, at 6A (reporting that, in the decade since the FDA 
approved the first deep-brain stimulation device for tremor control, approximately 
70,000 patients have received one); Ken Howard Wilan, Pacemakers Aren’t Just for the 
Heart Anymore, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2005, at E1. 
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United States Supreme Court confronted physician-assisted suicide 
in Washington v. Glucksberg.125  A group of doctors and patients had 
sought a declaration that one state’s prohibition on aiding 
someone to commit suicide violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Although all nine Justices concurred in 
the judgment rejecting this challenge,126 members of the Court 
disagreed about—and devoted most of their opinions to 
delineating—the appropriate methodology for engaging in 
substantive due process review. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion exhaustively 
surveyed the law’s treatment of suicide and those who assist with 
“self-murder,”127 concluding that the claimed right was neither 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” nor “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”128  As only infringements of 
fundamental rights would trigger strict scrutiny,129 the Court then 
held that the State of Washington’s rationales for the prohibition 
on assisting suicide satisfied minimum rationality review.130  Even 
 
 125. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 126. Justice O’Connor filed a brief concurring opinion (purporting to join 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court, but seeming to deviate in 
important respects), see id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and four other 
members of the Court filed opinions concurring in the judgment, see id. at 738 
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring); id. (Breyer, J., concurring).  Except for Justice Souter’s 
concurrence, these separate opinions applied equally to the Court’s 
contemporaneous decision in the companion case Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
(1997), discussed more fully below. 
 127. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19; id. at 719 (“Attitudes toward suicide 
itself have changed since [the 13th century], but our laws have consistently 
condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide.  Despite changes in 
medical technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the 
importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this 
prohibition.”). 
 128. Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 723 (“[W]e are 
confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected 
the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, 
mentally competent adults.  To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse 
centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State.”); id. at 727 (“That many of the rights and liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not 
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and 
personal decisions are so protected . . . .”); id. at 728 (“conclud[ing] that the 
asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause”). 
 129. See id. at 721. 
 130. See id. at 728–35 (discussing state interests in the preservation of life, 
prevention of suicide and treatment of depression, protection of the integrity of 
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though the Court reiterated Cruzan’s presumption that persons 
enjoyed a fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining treatments,131 
Glucksberg’s various opinions offered little guidance on how to 
distinguish that choice from physician-assisted suicide.132 
Even absent any fundamental right, state prohibitions against 
aiding suicide could not irrationally distinguish between patient 
refusals of life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide 
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.  In a companion 
case to Glucksberg decided on the same day, the Court rejected just 
such an equal protection challenge.133  A group of physicians and 
terminally ill patients had argued that New York state laws 
unconstitutionally differentiated between essentially identical 
practices: one statute authorized competent patients to reject 
resuscitation efforts, while another statute broadly criminalized 
promoting suicide without exempting physicians caring for 
 
the medical profession, protection of vulnerable groups, and prevention of a slide 
toward euthanasia); id. at 735 (“We need not weigh exactingly the relative 
strengths of these various interests.  They are unquestionably important and 
legitimate, and Washington’s ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related 
to their promotion and protection.”).  In the end, the Court left the question to 
the legislative process.  See id. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are 
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and 
practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”); id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 786–89 (Souter, J., concurring).  As it happens, Washington 
subsequently legalized physician-assisted suicide.  See infra note 207; see also 
Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress of Glucksberg’s 
Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1602–11 
(2008) (discussing Oregon’s law and unsuccessful legalization efforts in 
California). 
 131. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We have also assumed, and strongly 
suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”); id. at 725 (“Given the common-law rule 
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the 
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely 
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.”). 
 132. See id. at 725–26 (“[T]he two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as 
quite distinct . . . .  In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed 
assisted suicide—and even more do today—and we certainly gave no intimation 
that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be some-how 
transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide.”).  A couple of months 
before the Supreme Court announced its decisions, Congress hedged its bets by 
enacting the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997.  Pub. L. No. 105-12, 
§ 3, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14402 (2012)).  Without further defining 
the relevant terms, the statute provides that it does not apply to “the withholding 
or withdrawing of medical treatment or medical care.”  42 U.S.C. § 14402(b)(1). 
 133. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997). 
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terminally ill patients.134  The Supreme Court declined to find the 
two situations entirely comparable,135 explaining it as “the 
distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient 
die.”136  Although it conceded that gray areas could arise,137 the 
Court emphasized that causation and intent serve as relevant 
factors in drawing the distinction.138 
Given the Supreme Court’s decisions, arguable distinctions 
among seemingly similar cases continue to matter,139 even if such 
efforts ultimately fail to convincingly differentiate permissible 
treatment withdrawals from impermissible physician aid in dying.140  
 
 134. See id. at 796–98; see also id. at 806–07 (elaborating on the evolution of the 
New York statutes).  The Court conceded that the Equal Protection Clause 
“embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike.”  Id. at 799. 
 135. See id. at 800–01 (“[W]e think the distinction between assisting suicide 
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and 
endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both important 
and logical; it is certainly rational.” (footnote omitted)); cf. id. at 800 n.6 (“Of 
course, as respondents’ lawsuit demonstrates, there are differences of opinion 
within the medical profession on this question.”). 
 136. Id. at 807. 
 137. See id. at 807–08 (“Granted, in some cases, the line between the two may 
not be clear . . . .”); see also Howard Brody, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts: 
Moral Equivalence, Double Effect, and Clinical Practice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 939, 961 
(1998) (“The public policy distinction works precisely because many cases fit 
nicely within the general categories, but there are also going to be messy cases 
which sit on the fences.”). 
 138. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801 (“The distinction comports with fundamental 
legal principles of causation and intent.  First, when a patient refuses life-
sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or 
pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he 
is killed by that medication.”); id. at 802 (“The law has long used actors’ intent or 
purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have the same result.”). 
 139. See Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of 
Physician Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2000); Franklin G. 
Miller et al., Assisted Suicide Compared with Refusal of Treatment: A Valid Distinction?, 
132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 470 (2000); Norton Spritz, Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
Three Crucial Distinctions, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 869, 871–74 (1997); Daniel P. 
Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 56–63 
(1998) (trying to clarify the distinction based on specific intention and proximate 
causation). 
 140. See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. 
L. REV. 1173, 1200 (1996); id. at 1180 (noting that “in many complex cases the 
elements of these notions are so intertwined as to almost defy neat classification”); 
Cantor, supra note 44, at 1798–808; id. at 1816 (“[N]o convincing rationale 
supports the prevailing distinction between killing and letting die.  And the most 
frequently voiced concern about [physician-assisted death]—the hazards of 
abuse—does not seem significantly more threatening than in the case of [life-
sustaining medical treatment].”); Cantor & Thomas, supra note 139, at 153–73 
(elaborating); Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for 
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As many have noted, the act/omission distinction breaks down 
quickly in this context.141 
Causal judgments about what triggered a patient’s death—the 
underlying disease or the physician’s intervention—all too often lie 
in the eye of the beholder.142  Although less clear when a patient 
refuses from the outset (leaving uncertainty about whether a 
recommended intervention might have prolonged life), the 
withdrawal of a life-sustaining intervention qualifies as a proximate 
cause of a patient’s death, even if the death certificate lists the 
underlying disease or condition.143  Intention suffers from the same 
slippery quality.  The majority in Quill contrasted a physician’s 
assent to a patient’s refusal or request for withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment (as an intent to abide by the patient’s wishes) 
with a physician’s prescription of lethal medication (as reflecting 
an intent to cause death),144 but even the latter situation reflects the 
physician’s intent to abide by the patient’s wishes,145 and substantial 
 
State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 856–57 (1997); id. at 823–25 (calling the 
central distinction a necessary fiction); David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction 
Between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually 
Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837. 
 141. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296–97 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 645–46 (2000); Meisel, supra note 140, 
at 826–32; Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028–29 (1992); see also id. at 2040 (“Physician-assisted suicide 
is not fundamentally different from the withholding or withdrawing of medical 
treatment.”). 
 142. See Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 643–45; Alexander Morgan Capron, Death 
and the Court, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 25, 27 (“[A]s every ethics 
committee member knows, this view of causation is much too simple, for every 
event has many causes; a conclusion about causation simply reflects a judgment 
about the right place to assign responsibility.”).  Even so, speed and certainty of 
demise do seem like relevant factors. 
 143. See Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. 
L. REV. 693, 703 (1994); see also Orentlicher, supra note 140, at 840 (“When a 
physician writes a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates, the physician’s role 
in the patient’s death is more attenuated than is that of the physician who turns 
off a ventilator on a patient who cannot breathe without assistance.”).  In fact, 
most deaths of patients in health care institutions spring from treatment 
withdrawals.  See Kathy Faber-Langendoen & Paul N. Lanken, Dying Patients in the 
Intensive Care Unit: Foregoing Treatment, Maintaining Care, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 886, 888 (2000); Charles L. Sprung et al., Changes in Forgoing Life-Sustaining 
Treatments in the United States: Concern for the Future, 71 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 512, 513 
(1996) (“Up to 79% of deaths in the ICU have been shown to occur after the 
forgoing of life-prolonging therapies.”). 
 144. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801–02 (1997). 
 145. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
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certainty that death will follow in the former situation would reflect 
an intent to cause death even if not rising to the level of mens rea 
under the criminal law.146 
B. Situating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices 
Academics have spilled plenty of ink commenting on these 
legal issues,147 but, as far as I can tell, not one of them has 
 
concurring). 
 146. See David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting 
Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 958 (1997); see 
also Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Violating Legal and Moral 
Prohibitions, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 407, 411 (2006) (“[A] physician, even one 
motivated by compassion, who enters a suffering pulmonary patient’s room and 
without consent pulls the plug from the patient’s respirator is guilty of murder if 
death follows from the physician’s action.”); Cantor & Thomas, supra note 139, at 
94 n.41, 113–17 (rejecting the focus on specific intent); id. at 121–38 (explaining 
that administration of high-dose analgesics for palliative purposes but with a high 
likelihood of causing death could lead to prosecution).  But see Gorsuch, supra 
note 141, at 647–57, 700–02, 706 (defending reliance on intentionality); id. at 
709–10 (“[A] meaningful moral-legal distinction exists based on intent: the right 
to refuse need not involve any intention to die or kill, whereas the supposed right 
to assisted suicide and euthanasia always does.”); cf. Miles J. Edwards & Susan W. 
Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Request of a Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: 
The Doctor’s Anguish, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 254, 256 (1992); Timothy E. Quill, 
The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1039, 1040 (1993) 
(“[M]ultilayered intentions are present in most, if not all, end-of-life decisions.”).  
Futility judgments, see infra note 170, seem in some tension with these claims.  In 
any event, such questions do not arise solely in criminal law settings, though 
liability issues normally relate to the opposite problem—namely, when physicians 
encounter lawsuits for the “wrongful prolongation of life.”  See Holly Fernandez 
Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law 
Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 139–48, 168–78 (2008); S. Elizabeth Wilborn 
Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1060–69, 1075–91 (1998); Philip G. 
Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the 
Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673 (1998). 
 147. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the 
Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182 (2001); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1501 (2008); Ronald Dworkin, Lecture, Euthanasia, Morality, and Law, 31 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1147 (1998); David J. Garrow, The Right to Die: Death with Dignity in America, 
68 MISS. L.J. 407 (1998); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Legalization of Assisted Suicide and the 
Law of Unintended Consequences: A Review of the Dutch and Oregon Experiments and 
Leading Utilitarian Arguments for Legal Change, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1347; Yale Kamisar, 
Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121 (1998); Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 
395 (1996); Penney Lewis, Rights Discourse and Assisted Suicide, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 
45 (2001); Stephen W. Smith, Some Realism About End of Life: The Current Prohibition 
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considered on what side of the line to place requests to deactivate 
implanted cardiac-assist devices.148  A loose-leaf legal treatise 
devoted to right-to-die issues recently added brief references to the 
question,149 but, after citing the HRS consensus statement and a few 
of the medical journal articles discussed previously, it simply 
offered the conclusory statement that deactivating CIEDs qualified 
as the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.150  This strikes me as 
far from self-evident. 
Prescribing fatal doses of barbiturates—the prototypical form 
of physician-assisted suicide considered in Glucksberg and Quill—
obviously differs from deactivating an implanted cardiac-assist 
device, but the latter in turn differs from disconnecting tubes or 
unplugging external life-support machinery, which state courts 
generally have allowed.  Does my original intuition—namely, that 
“a heart transplant patient who fares poorly and regrets his choice 
presumably would have no right to ask a surgeon simply to remove 
the new organ or perhaps try to ‘deactivate’ it by applying a strong 
electrical current”151—help to situate the problem?  If that 
 
and the Euthanasia Underground, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 55 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123 (1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, Justifying Assisted Suicide: 
Comments on the Ongoing Debate, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 893 
(2000); Symposium, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 377 (2000) (book reviews); Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing 
Death After Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1998) (including 
contributions from Robert Burt, Ezekiel Emanuel, and Yale Kamisar). 
 148. The closest that I could find was an old column authored by a group of 
medical ethicists in a state bar journal.  See Frederick Paola et al., Automatic 
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (AICDS): Management Under New York State’s DNR 
Law, N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 36, 37 (concluding that ICDs represent a 
form of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) so a “do not resuscitate” (DNR) 
order would allow for their deactivation, but noting that, in the case study 
presented, the family members disagreed because they thought that the device 
“had, by then, become a part of the patient”); see also Aine McGeary & Anselm 
Eldergill, Medicolegal Issues Arising When Pacemaker and Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillator Devices Are Deactivated in Terminally Ill Patients, 50 MED. SCI. & L. 40, 41, 
43 (2010) (offering a brief and somewhat confused perspective from the U.K.); 
Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 449 (making a passing reference to pacemakers); 
Thomas D. Manganello, Disabling the Pacemaker: The Heart-Rending Decision Every 
Competent Patient Has a Right to Make, HEALTH CARE L. MONTHLY, Jan. 2000, at 3. 
 149. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF 
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 1A.13[C], 6.03[A1] (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) 
(indicating that this material was added in 2011). 
 150. See id. at § 6-62 (“[D]isabling that device results in the patient’s death 
from the underlying illness or condition that necessitated use of the device in the 
first place, just as the withdrawal of any other life-sustaining treatment would.”). 
 151. See NOAH, supra note 1, at 1148; see also Simon, supra note 88, at 14–15 
(suggesting the same parallel); Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 71 (“Certainly, this 
37
Noah: Turn the Beat Around: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-assist Devic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1266 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
hypothetical describes an even more extreme and unpalatable 
version of physician aid in dying, then does CIED deactivation 
more closely resemble it or, as most ethicists have argued, remain 
firmly in the same domain as the withdrawal of ventilators and 
gastrostomy tubes (or advance directives rejecting any use of 
external defibrillators for resuscitation)?152 
Deactivation differs from manually removing tubes or 
unplugging equipment—physicians typically would not surgically 
explant the life-saving device; instead, they would induce a retained 
device to malfunction.153  Surely, convincing an electrophysiologist 
to reprogram a pulse generator so that it triggers a potentially fatal 
arrhythmia would qualify as active euthanasia.154  Perhaps the 
 
intuition seems correct if one is talking about a heart transplant.  Stopping the 
function of a transplanted heart with an injection of KCl [potassium chloride] 
seems morally no different from stopping a native heart with an injection of 
KCl.”); Stein, Heart Pump, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting Robert Veatch, a prominent 
bioethicist at Georgetown University: “If you think about stopping the left 
ventricular assist device as something like stopping the heart, then you have to 
deal with the possibility that this is an active killing.”); cf. Veatch, supra note 87, at 
309 (“Throwing a switch that stops a TAH is more like injecting a drug that 
paralyzes the heart muscle . . . .  [This] would be considered direct, active killing.  
How can it be that turning off the heart is any different?”).  Dr. Mueller and his 
associates distinguished such a case, though without anticipating these alternative 
methods of “deactivating” a transplanted heart.  See Mueller et al., supra note 86, at 
795 (“Removing a [heart] valve or an organ is invasive and painful and therefore 
introduces a new pathology (e.g., a surgical wound), whereas turning off a VAD is 
noninvasive and painless and does not introduce a new pathology.”). 
 152. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“ICDs are unique.  Though not 
organic, a patient may consider the implant as a part of his physical 
being . . . .  [A]n ICD is neither perfectly analogous with [an external] medical 
device nor a biological transplant; these two models of thought represent 
extremes between which we believe ICDs fall.”). 
 153. Imagine that, instead of disconnecting the endotracheal tube for a 
ventilator (perhaps something about the patient’s condition would have made that 
unduly cumbersome or extremely painful), a physician created a closed circuit so 
that exhaled carbon dioxide or nitrogen rather than oxygen returned through the 
intake tube—I trust that no one would call that simply withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment.  Cf. Russel D. Ogden, Non-Physician Assisted Suicide: The Technological 
Imperative of the Deathing Counterculture, 25 DEATH STUD. 387, 391–93 (2001) 
(discussing a “closed circuit breathing system” called the Debreather); id. at 394 
(describing “devices using cylinders of compressed [inert] gas”); Russel D. Ogden 
et al., Assisted Suicide by Oxygen Deprivation with Helium at a Swiss Right-to-Die 
Organisation, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 174, 175–76 (2010). 
 154. Actually, so would CIED deactivation, just as administering—as opposed 
to merely prescribing for self-administration—a fatal drug dose goes beyond 
physician-assisted suicide.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that “a physician who would provide a drug for a 
patient to administer might well go the further step of administering the drug 
himself; so, the barrier between assisted suicide and euthanasia could become 
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principle of “double effect” (which basically overlooks the risk of 
causing an adverse outcome that arises as a foreseeable but 
unintended and unavoidable consequence of pursuing a laudable 
purpose) would shield a physician who deactivates an implanted 
cardiac-assist device in a terminally ill patient from criminal 
charges.  Normally this question arises when the administration of 
controlled substances for palliative purposes may itself hasten 
death.155  Although shutting off an LVAD generally will pose an 
immediate risk of death,156 deactivating an ICD or pacemaker rarely 
would do so.  If ICD withdrawal qualifies as a palliative measure, 
then the physician’s knowledge that the procedure exposed the 
patient to a heightened risk of death would not suffice to turn this 
into active euthanasia.157  The same reasoning would not, however, 
apply to pacemaker deactivation.158 
 
porous”); see also Am. Med. Ass’n, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Decisions 
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (explaining that physician-
assisted suicide “is contrary to the prohibition against using the tools of medicine to 
cause a patient’s death” (emphasis added)).  In the CIED context, assisted suicide 
would arise where a physician instructs a patient about how to use a programmer 
or magnets to shut off the device.  Ultimately, however, this distinction would 
make no difference, even in the few states (including Washington) that have 
legalized physician-assisted suicide only by the prescription of certain drugs.  See 
infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 155. See J. Andrew Billings & Larry R. Churchill, Monolithic Moral Frameworks: 
How Are the Ethics of Palliative Sedation Discussed in the Clinical Literature?, 15 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 709, 710–11 (2012); Charles Foster et al., The Double Effect Effect, 
20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 56, 66–69 (2011); Jeffrey T. Berger, 
Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–
June 2010, at 32, 33–34. 
 156. See Larry A. Allen et al., Decision Making in Advanced Heart Failure: A 
Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 125 CIRCULATION 1928, 1938 
(2012) (explaining that LVAD deactivation would, on average, lead to death in 
approximately 20 minutes); see also Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 548 
(“LVAD therapy is a relatively new medical technology that makes us aware of 
wrinkles in end-of-life decisions that we may not have considered before.”). 
 157. See Ballentine, supra note 32, at 16; Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 896 
(“Withdrawal of shock therapy when a patient has made the decision for comfort 
care prevents painful shocks at the end of life.”); cf. Brody, supra note 137, at 946 
(discussing application of the double effect principle to the removal of a 
ventilator). 
 158. See Braun et al., supra note 80, at 128 (“[I]t is rare that disabling the 
pacemaker will result in a swift and painless death.  It is more likely it would result 
in symptomatic bradycardia with slow and relentless failure of major organs and, 
perhaps, an even poorer quality of death.”); Robert E. Enck, Editorial, Management 
of Cardiac Devices as the End Nears, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 7, 7 (2005) 
(“[T]he issue of pacemaker deactivation is less clear-cut.  Is this the double effect 
in reverse? . . .  This ultimately hastens death but then produces a slow, agonizing 
end punctuated by heart failure.”); Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 896 
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1. Questions of Ownership and Control 
Perhaps a property law framework might facilitate analysis.159  
Ownership issues can get tricky upon device removal or recipient 
death,160 but deactivation requests involve a device still inside a 
living patient.161  When you get an implant, it belongs to you;162 
patients literally may take these to the grave with them.163  No 
 
(“[D]iscontinuation of pacing therapy may worsen heart failure because of 
complete atrioventricular block or lead to syncope.  This study demonstrates that 
continuing pacing therapies in pacemaker-dependent individuals did not 
artificially prolong life . . . .”); Rhymes et al., supra note 78, at 1062 (“Because 
there is no significant ongoing burden incurred by the pacemaker, double-effect 
reasoning cannot be used to justify deactivating the pacemaker.”). 
 159. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“Arguably, some other sort of 
property law model (though not one concerned with fixtures) would be 
unavoidable in cases where the patient has paid for the device. . . .  [I]t is worth 
briefly mentioning some of the relevant considerations that a property model 
raises.”).  These commentators made some inapt references to the duties of car 
owners in the U.K. and ultimately sought only to make a far more limited claim—
namely, that physicians could not unilaterally deactivate an ICD on grounds of 
futility (as they could in the case of an external device that remained under their 
continued control).  See id. at 539–40 (concluding that only patients or their 
surrogates could demand deactivation); see also id. at 539 (“[H]e may be able to 
claim a physical ownership that would prevent interference by a third party.”); 
infra note 167 (elaborating).  A consensus statement co-sponsored by HRS (and 
which focused on monitoring rather than deactivation of CIEDs) cited this article 
for the proposition that “[t]he decision to inactivate an ICD cannot be made 
unilaterally by the patient’s medical provider.”  Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 920. 
 160. Cf. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480–82 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the plaintiff had a sufficient interest in her dead spouse’s corneas to 
claim a deprivation of due process); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 
P.2d 479, 487–97 (Cal. 1990) (rejecting conversion claims after researchers 
created a valuable cell line from a spleen removed from a patient).  See generally 
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000).  I 
encountered these issues in 2000 while serving as a member of the expert advisory 
panel for the National Institutes of Health’s technology assessment conference on 
retrieving implanted medical devices for failure analysis. 
 161. See supra notes 60–73 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of 
an internal/external distinction). 
 162. See John H. Fielder & Jonathan Black, But Doctor, It’s My Hip!: The Fate of 
Failed Medical Devices, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 113, 124 (1995) (“Most implants 
are purchased for patients by a third party. . . .  [I]t seems clear that the patient 
owns the device . . . .”); id. at 125 (“We advocate a strong presumption in favor of 
the patient owning any medical device whether implanted or 
explanted. . . .  Implanted medical devices are (new) parts of one’s body and 
should be treated as such, regardless of who has paid for them.”). 
 163. See Bharat K. Kantharia et al., Reuse of Explanted Permanent Pacemakers 
Donated by Funeral Homes, 109 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 238, 239 (2012) (“Surveys of 
morticians in [two cities] have indicated that nearly 19% of deceased patients 
possess a cardiac device, and 85% of these are buried with these patients . . . .”); see 
also William J. Groh, Editorial, You Shouldn’t Take It with You: Postmortem Device 
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physician, hospital, curious manufacturer, jilted creditor, or 
regulatory agency may demand its return.164  Contrast this with 
equipment used in hospitals (including external pacemakers, 
defibrillators, and heart pumps),165 which patients (and their 
insurers) pay handsomely to use but have no right to retain.  
Similarly, external life-sustaining devices used in the home typically 
get leased.166 
If implanted cardiac-assist devices really do not differ from 
other life-sustaining interventions, then physicians could deactivate 
them on grounds of futility (in theory even without patient or 
proxy consent, though in practice that seems highly unlikely).167  
 
Reuse, 9 HEART RHYTHM 215 (2012).  In cases of cremation, however, pulse 
generators first must get excised to guard against a possible explosion, and loved 
ones sometimes find wire fragments from the leads among the ashes.  See Braun et 
al., supra note 80, at 130; Christopher P. Gale & Graham P. Mulley, Pacemaker 
Explosions in Crematoria: Problems and Possible Solutions, 95 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 353, 
354 (2002); Butler, supra note 76, at 38. 
 164. See James N. Kirkpatrick et al., Letter, Postmortem Analysis and Retrieval of 
Implantable Pacemakers and Defibrillators, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1649, 1650 (2006) 
(finding that ninety-three percent of funeral directors and embalmers in the 
Chicago area responding to a survey “said that without the consent of the family, it 
would not be appropriate to . . . remove the devices”); James N. Kirkpatrick et al., 
Reuse of Pacemakers and Defibrillators in Developing Countries: Logistical, Legal, and 
Ethical Barriers and Solutions, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1623, 1626 (2010) (“Presuming that 
in most circumstances patients own their devices and may control their disposition 
after removal, the aforementioned pacemaker/defibrillator living will would allow 
patients officially to authorize embalmers to remove pulse generators for donation 
or return to the manufacturers . . . .”); cf. Gowri Ramachandran, Assault and Battery 
on Property, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 263–64 (2010) (“The intuition that once 
something is internal to a physically continuous body it is properly thought of as 
part of that body also seems to give force to fictitious horror scenarios in which 
artificial organs are repossessed, in bloody scenarios, by heartless corporations.”). 
 165. Cf. Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 701–02 (“Patient[s] often reject treatment 
because they . . . are tired of invasive tubes, or simply wish to leave the hospital and 
go home.”); Simon, supra note 88, at 15 (focusing on portability: “If ventilators 
become backpack devices attached to a tracheostomy in otherwise independent 
patients, we may have to reassess our permissive attitude towards extubation.”); id. 
at 14 (contrasting LVADs from “other life-support technologies [that] can be used 
only in a professional health care setting with ongoing medical support”). 
 166. AEDs may represent an exception.  See Barnaby J. Feder, Do It Yourself: The 
Home Heart Defibrillator, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at C1 (reporting that consumers 
can purchase these nonprescription devices for less than $2000).  In such a case, a 
person no longer wanting to get resuscitated could simply instruct their caregivers 
not to use the AED. 
 167. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“Considering an ICD as a 
continuing medical intervention permits a unilateral decision by a doctor to 
deactivate the device, even if this is contrary to a patient’s wish.”); see also Berger, 
supra note 39, at 633 (“Physicians of patients with limited physical or cognitive 
function may assess continued use of ICDs as ‘futile.’ . . .  This statement prompts 
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Ownership normally means the freedom to make a range of 
choices about disposition and use,168 but here it means that 
hospitals and their employees have transferred control of an item 
over to a patient,169 which would prevent health care professionals 
from unilaterally withdrawing the treatment on grounds of 
futility.170  If the patient wanted to stop using such an item, then it 
 
a question the medical community has not yet answered: How ought already 
implanted defibrillators be used in patients with limited life expectancies?”); 
Katrina A. Bramstedt, Contemplating Total Artificial Heart Inactivation in Cases of 
Futility, 27 DEATH STUD. 295, 301–03 (2003); Katrina A. Bramstedt, Editorial, 
Destination Nowhere: A Potential Dilemma with Ventricular Assist Devices, 54 ASAIO J. 1, 
2 (2008) (“[N]o therapy should be considered permanent.  Often, there comes a 
time when implanted therapies such as pacemakers, cardioverter defibrillators, 
and VADs should be terminated before a patient is actually declared dead.”); 
Padeletti et al., supra note 99, at 1482 (“[I]f the device has an ON/OFF button [as 
ICDs do], then the physician has the power to withhold such treatment on the 
grounds of futility, even if the patient demands otherwise.”); cf. Tia P. Powell & 
Mehmet C. Oz, Editorial, Discontinuing the LVAD: Ethical Considerations, 63 ANNALS 
THORACIC SURGERY 1223, 1223 (1997) (“[W]e have not encountered a case where 
we found it necessary or appropriate to discontinue the LVAD in the face of 
objections from a patient’s family.”).  But see Veatch, supra note 87, at 311 (calling 
Bramstedt’s conclusion “offensive”); id. at 311–14 (elaborating on his broader 
objections to futility judgments); Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 920 (“The decision 
to inactivate an ICD cannot be made unilaterally by the patient’s medical 
provider.”). 
 168. See Roger F. Friedman, Comment, It’s My Body and I’ll Die If I Want To: A 
Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 183, 204 (1995).  For instance, patients may indicate a desire to donate their 
CIEDs after death (or the decedents’ family members may do so).  See Timir S. 
Baman et al., Feasibility of Postmortem Device Acquisition for Potential Reuse in 
Underserved Nations, 9 HEART RHYTHM 211, 213 (2012) (“The goal of our proposed 
initiative is to create a reproducible model where funeral directors are given a 
framework to consent families of loved ones for device removal prior to burial or 
cremation.”); Timir S. Baman et al., Pacemaker Reuse: An Initiative to Alleviate the 
Burden of Symptomatic Bradyarrhythmia in Impoverished Nations Around the World, 122 
CIRCULATION 1649, 1650 (2010) (“[A] great majority of the patient population 
with devices and the general public [are] willing to consent to cardiac device 
removal for philanthropic reuse in underserved nations.”). 
 169. These questions arise when courts ask whether hospitals or surgeons fall 
within the chain of distribution for purposes of applying strict products liability 
after an implanted device causes injury.  See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products 
Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 918 & n.343, 923–25 (2009). 
 170. See generally John M. Luce, A History of Resolving Conflicts over End-of-Life 
Care in Intensive Care Units in the United States, 38 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1623 (2010); 
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robert D. Truog, Medical 
Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2009); Patrick Moore, Note, An End-of-Life 
Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining 
Treatment That Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2007); 
Symposium, Medical Futility Issues, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 229 (2008); Pam Belluck, 
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would require a new round of intervention by medical personnel 
rather than their continued involvement with respect to something 
that they retain ownership and control over.  If the patient did not 
want to stop using the device, then physician deactivation would 
constitute homicide.171 
Along similar lines, a pair of physicians once suggested that 
ICDs resemble “fixtures” added to real property.172  The law of 
fixtures attempts to define when personal property (e.g., a kitchen 
appliance or a fence) becomes sufficiently integrated with the 
structure or land so that, in the event of ambiguity, it normally 
would get conveyed as part of the package.173  The authors of this 
article emphasized as follows: 
[T]he ICD is an indwelling device and arguably has become 
a part of the patient.  In this way, it is distinguishable from 
an external defibrillator [or] a ventilator . . . .  The idea 
that something can have such an ontologic 
metamorphosis, becoming a part of something 
theretofore disjoint, is intriguing and not without 
precedent.174 
 
Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, 
§ 1, at 1. 
 171. See Veatch, supra note 87, at 311 (calling unilateral action by physicians to 
deactivate TAHs “murder”).  Similarly, I have no doubt that, if a CIED 
malfunctions or is programmed incorrectly, cf. Mary Jane Rasmussen et al., 
Unintentional Deactivation of Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators in Health Care 
Settings, 77 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 855, 856 (2002) (discussing errors that may occur 
after implantation), courts resolving wrongful death claims against the 
manufacturer or physician would treat the device’s failure as the proximate cause 
of death even if a preexisting disease process had made the patient vulnerable in 
the event of such a failure, see Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in 
Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 390 & nn.69–70 (2005); see 
also Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1998) (allowing loss-of-a-
chance claim against a physician who unilaterally decided not to resuscitate a 
patient suffering from numerous maladies); Beauchamp, supra note 140, at 1184. 
 172. See Frederick A. Paola & Robert M. Walker, Deactivating the Implantable 
Cardioverter-Defibrillator: A Biofixture Analysis, 93 S. MED. J. 20, 21–22 (2000).  Both 
authors were affiliated with the University of South Florida’s College of Medicine, 
and Dr. Paola also held a law degree. 
 173. See generally Ronald W. Polston, The Fixtures Doctrine: Was It Ever Really the 
Law?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 455 (1995); Marc L. Roark, Groping Along Between Things 
Real and Things Personal: Defining Fixtures in Law and Policy in the UCC, 78 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1437 (2010). 
 174. Paola & Walker, supra note 172, at 21; see also id. at 22 (“We believe that 
the ICD falls into that gray zone, between unequivocal biofixtures (such as 
transplanted allogenic organs) at one extreme and unequivocally extrinsic 
medical treatments . . . at the other, where reasonable arguments can be made 
characterizing it as one or the other.”); id. (“As indwelling devices like ICDs and 
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They had, however, a fairly limited question in mind when drawing 
this parallel—namely, what happens when a surrogate 
decisionmaker consents to a “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order for 
an incompetent patient who the physician later discovers to have 
an ICD?  The authors concluded that, under such circumstances, 
the DNR should not authorize deactivation of the device.175  They 
clearly assumed that, absent an ambiguity, the physician could turn 
off the ICD,176 evidently not appreciating the fact that their 
invocation of the law of fixtures and focus on the peculiarities 
associated with a fully implanted device might cast serious doubt on 
the legality of deactivation even upon a direct request from a 
competent patient.177 
A focus on device ownership raises subsidiary questions about 
the nature and scope of the treatment relationships between the 
patient and different physicians.178  When a patient gets hooked up 
 
pacemakers become more prevalent, physicians will increasingly confront this 
complex set of issues.”). 
 175. See id. at 21 (“This distinction may provide an alternative basis for treating 
the use of the ICD differently than conventional CPR and for not interpreting the 
family’s consent to a DNR order as implicitly authorizing its deactivation.”); id. at 
22 (“In our ICD case, we seek an answer to the question: What resuscitative 
measures that were not explicitly forgone by the patient’s family may properly be 
forgone in reliance on its consent to the DNR order?”). 
 176. See id. at 22 (“[T]he family might regard the ICD as an intrinsic part of 
the patient . . . and conclude that deactivating the ICD is fundamentally different 
from forgoing extrinsic treatments.  In these circumstances, serious limitations are 
placed on a physician’s liberty to interfere with the functioning of the device.”); cf. 
Berger, supra note 39, at 631–33 (concluding on other grounds that a DNR order 
does not invariably call for ICD deactivation). 
 177. Shortly afterwards, the authors alluded to this possibility.  See Frederick 
Paola & Robert M. Walker, Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw Low-Burden Interventions 
in Chronically Ill Patients?, 284 JAMA 1380 (2000) (“[A]cts interfering with 
pacemaker function would be more akin to killing than to letting die.”).  Their 
letter prompted a pair of generally dismissive responses.  See Edmund D. 
Pellegrino, Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw Low-Burden Interventions in Chronically Ill 
Patients?—Reply, 284 JAMA 1381 (2000) (“This is a specious argument 
because . . . [t]he pacemaker has not undergone any change in its nature and is 
still a mechanical device.”); Jill A. Rhymes et al., Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw 
Low-Burden Interventions in Chronically Ill Patients?—Reply, 284 JAMA 1381 (2000) 
(“While Paola and Walker have proposed a very interesting line of ethical inquiry, 
it is not yet sufficiently developed . . . .”); see also England et al., supra note 63, at 
539 (“Allowing a duality whose resolution is purely determined by the patient’s 
understanding may lead to a plurality of bad outcomes.”); Sulmasy, supra note 56, 
at 69 (“This interesting foray into ontology and ethics raises many more questions 
than it answers . . . .”). 
 178. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-1 (2d ed. 2000); id. 
at 261 (“After surgery, where follow-up care is needed, a surgeon must continue to 
care for the patient until the threat of post-operative complications is past.”); 
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to hospital machinery, he or she remains under the care of various 
doctors and nurses,179 and a request for the withdrawal of life-
supporting treatment effectuates the patient’s right to terminate or 
limit the scope of a treatment relationship.180  When a patient 
departs the hospital but remains hooked up to machinery, health 
care professionals presumably remain responsible for supervising 
use of the equipment.181  When, however, a patient walks out the 
door with a pacemaker, ICD, or LVAD, generally they are “good to 
go,”182 subject, of course, to periodic return visits including eventual 
 
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient Relationship 
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4TH 132 (1982 & Supp. 2012). 
 179. Thus, one court offered the following explanation of the equivalence 
between withholding and withdrawing a life-sustaining intervention: 
Even though these life support devices are, to a degree, “self-propelled,” 
each pulsation of the respirator or each drop of fluid introduced into the 
patient’s body by intravenous feeding devices is comparable to a 
manually administered injection or item of medication.  Hence 
“disconnecting” of the mechanical devices is comparable to withholding 
the manually administered injection or medication. 
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 1983) (ordering the 
dismissal of murder charges against physicians who removed life-sustaining 
treatments at the request of the patient’s family).  Would it also be accurate to 
regard each pulse from an implanted pacemaker (or jolt from an ICD) as akin to 
letting physicians utilize external versions of these same devices on a hospitalized 
patient? 
 180. See Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 653 (explaining that physicians who 
comply with such requests “may intend only to discontinue treatment to permit 
the patient to go home, to live without intrusive assistance”); id. at 706 (willing to 
“leave ample room for patients to refuse the often hyper-technological 
burdensome end-of-life care found in modern hospital environments”); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 795 (1989) (envisioning 
“the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and 
tended to by medical professionals[;] . . . the most elemental acts of existence—
such as breathing, digesting, and circulating blood—are forced upon him by an 
external agency”). 
 181. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (involving 
quadriplegic using respirator at home); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987) 
(involving an outpatient patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) who 
“died shackled to the respirator” during the pendency of her appeal); id. at 408 
(“Mrs. Farrell was paralyzed and confined to bed in need of around-the-clock 
nursing care.”); id. at 414–15 (addressing the fact that she was at home).  See 
generally BRINGING THE HOSPITAL HOME: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH-
TECH HOME CARE (John D. Arras ed., 1995). 
 182. See Simon, supra note 88, at 14 (“LVADs are implanted into patients and, 
once implanted, can perform their functions independently of hospital-based 
equipment or even medical intervention.  They are meant for patients to live with 
at home.”).  Although they do not raise end-of-life issues, prosthetic limbs (and 
joints) may provide another useful context for thinking about whether a 
mechanical device has become an integral part of a person.  See Ramachandran, 
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replacement when the battery dies.183 
A request to deactivate an implanted cardiac-assist device may 
require seeking out medical personnel and entering into a new 
relationship for the sole purpose of discontinuing treatment.184  
Herein lies one of the practical problems that have arisen in these 
situations, especially when patients are dying from some other 
condition: upon entering hospice, they sometimes forget to 
 
supra note 164, at 273–74 (“[I]n the case of a pacemaker or a robotic arm, humans 
have merged with inorganic property . . . .  [A]s these mergers between what we 
have called ‘the body’ and ‘property’ become more common, sustaining different 
formal legal statuses for the inorganic and the organic, for the ‘human’ and the 
‘non-human,’ or for the internal and the external, may appear more and more 
arbitrary.”); Rao, supra note 160, at 454 n.483 (“[A] pacemaker or an artificial limb 
may be governed by the law of property only so long as it is separate from a living 
human body.  Once integrated with the body, however, such objects become part 
of the person and should be afforded protection under the individual’s right of 
privacy.”); Collin R. Bockman, Note, Cybernetic-Enhancement Technology and the 
Future of Disability Law, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–31 (2010); id. at 1317 (“In the 
near future, advances in neuroscience and robotics will change the way our society 
views the human body by further reinforcing the concept of the body as a machine 
with interchangeable, replaceable, and upgradeable parts.”); Brian Vastag, 
Paralyzed Woman Moves Robotic Arm with Her Mind, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, at A1. 
 183. See Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 911–13 (HRS consensus statement 
offering guidelines for the nature and frequency of follow-up monitoring of 
patients with different CIEDs); id. at 922 (emphasizing the importance of regular 
monitoring after implantation); see also Mark H. Schoenfeld, Editorial, Deciding 
Against Defibrillator Replacement: Second-Guessing the Past?, 23 PACING & CLINICAL 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 2019, 2020 (2000) (“[T]he most common reason for 
generator replacement, namely battery depletion, can be simply addressed with an 
outpatient procedure.”). 
 184. See Nathan Goldstein et al., Management of Implantable Cardioverter-
Defibrillators in Hospice: A Nationwide Survey, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 296, 298 
(2010) (“Hospices must create relationships with local electrophysiologists and 
representatives from device manufacturing companies to ensure that patients—
especially those who cannot leave their place of residence—can have their [ICD] 
devices reprogrammed [i.e., deactivated].”); Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 895 
(noting that it has become “increasingly difficult for an electrophysiologist to 
closely follow each patient, shifting follow-up to primary care physicians or 
cardiologists,” adding that “device manufacturer representatives are frequently 
relied on to perform device reprogramming”); Kolata, supra note 2, at A1 
(reporting that, according to one expert, “medical care had become so 
fragmented that doctors implanting the devices in patients still functioning well 
could have a very different impression from doctors who care for people in the 
end stages of heart disease”); see also Strachan et al., supra note 33, at 10 (“It has 
been suggested that the onus for considering ICDs in relation to [end-of-life] 
planning and issues surrounding resuscitation must also be shared by those 
involved in implanting the devices.”); Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 916 
(recognizing the “important interdependent relationship between the referring or 
primary care physician, the implanting center, the implanting physician and the 
CIED follow-up clinic”). 
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mention their CIED, or their oncologists may defer to the 
judgment of the patient’s (former) cardiologist.185  In fact, 
electrophysiologists who order CIED deactivation typically would 
have to utilize a separate device (i.e., the programmer) not sold to 
the patient but retained by the hospital and often delegate the task 
to employees of the device manufacturer.186 
2. Invoking Informed Consent Doctrine 
The doctrine of informed consent also may help to define the 
point where one crosses the line.  After all, the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical care originates in principles of patient self-
determination.187  The right to seek withdrawal of such care closely 
tracks the right to refuse it initially.  The parallel seems closest 
 
 185. See Meier, supra note 2, at B1; Stein, Devices Can Interfere, supra note 2, at 
A1; see also Amy S. Kelley et al., Management of Patients with ICDs at the End of Life 
(EOL): A Qualitative Study, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 440, 445 (2009) 
(“[I]n the context of advancing medical technology, which may be inadequately 
understood by patients and their primary care providers, subspecialists have an 
increasingly important role in discussions surrounding care at EOL.”); Jane 
MacIver & Heather J. Ross, Withdrawal of Ventricular Assist Device Support, 21 J. 
PALLIATIVE CARE 151, 155 (2005) (“Turning the [LVAD] off requires knowledge of 
how to silence alarms, cease pump operation, disconnect the equipment, and turn 
the power unit off. . . .  The physicians in the ICU felt that, since the transplant 
team had implanted the pump, the implanting surgeon should accept 
responsibility for withdrawing support.”); Mueller, supra note 51, at 1543 (“[O]ne 
would expect that fewer generalists have participated in and carried out CIED 
deactivations than electrophysiologists and others who manage patients with 
CIEDs.  In addition, carrying out CIED deactivations requires technical expertise 
and programming equipment that generalists do not have.”). 
 186. See Mueller et al., supra note 35, at 254 (“Evidence suggests that most 
CIEDs are deactivated by [industry employees], not by physicians or nurses.”); id. 
at 257, 260 (confirming this impression).  In the case of pacemakers, however, 
several companies do not allow their personnel to perform the deactivation.  See 
id. at 258; id. at 260 (“Even so, these [employees] reported participating in 
pacemaker deactivations by entering settings for deactivation into the CIED 
reprogramming instrument and having clinicians ‘push the button’ to execute the 
deactivation commands.”). 
 187. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The 
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally 
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”); Meisel, supra note 
140, at 845–49; id. at 821 (“Consent is the mechanism for implementing the 
fundamental principle of self-determination on which the entire edifice of the law 
of medical decision-making at the end of life . . . is built.”); Danuta Mendelson, 
Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, and Refusal of, 
Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 6, 36–41 (1996).  For 
more on this doctrine, see Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy 
Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 363–70 (2002). 
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when the patient did not consent initially—perhaps because the 
physician had acted in an emergency—and belatedly rejects the 
intervention.188  Alternatively, intermittent courses of treatment 
(e.g., dialysis) would offer recurring opportunities for a patient to 
withdraw simply by refusing to undergo another round.189  Courts 
and commentators generally have rejected suggestions that any 
meaningful distinction exists between initially withholding and 
later withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.190  Nonetheless, many 
clinicians remain uncomfortable with this equivalence.191 
A patient may, of course, revoke a previously granted 
permission, even once a procedure has commenced, at least up 
until the point of no return.192  After a procedure has concluded, 
however, a patient wishing it undone would have to enter into a 
 
 188. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221, 224 (Ct. App. 
1984) (holding that a patient, who suffered a collapsed lung during a routine 
biopsy, later had the right to demand the withdrawal of ventilator); see also M.G. 
Tweeddale, Grasping the Nettle—What to Do When Patients Withdraw Their Consent for 
Treatment, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 236, 237 (2002) (explaining that some patients may 
“wish to revoke the implied consent that was assumed when emergency treatment 
was initiated”).  Federal rules governing human subjects research also specify a 
right to withdraw.  See Noah, supra note 105, at 357 & n.122. 
 189. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104, 106 (Md. 2010); In re Spring, 405 
N.E.2d 115, 118, 120 (Mass. 1980); see also Lewis M. Cohen et al., Practical 
Considerations in Dialysis Withdrawal: “To Have That Option Is a Blessing,” 289 JAMA 
2113, 2114 (2003) (equating withdrawal with “discontinuation” of treatment). 
 190. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (N.J. 1985); Cantor & Thomas, supra 
note 139, at 92 (“Courts have uniformly rejected such a distinction, preferring to 
recognize a patient’s prerogative to forgo medical intervention (whether by 
withholding or withdrawing care) based on interests in self-determination and 
bodily integrity.”); see also Lipman, supra note 32, at 109 (“Often, deciding to 
withdraw treatment after a therapeutic trial is less problematic than deciding to 
withhold the treatment in the first place.  It is then clearer that the treatment did 
not result in clinical improvement and the risks of continuing treatment outweigh 
the benefits.”); Orentlicher, supra note 140, at 856 n.104 (“[E]thicists have long 
argued that withholding life-sustaining treatment is worse than treatment 
withdrawal because treatment withdrawal at least comes after a trial of the therapy, 
while withholding denies the chance for an unexpected recovery.”). 
 191. See Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 560, 563 (2006); Whitlock et al., 
supra note 84, at 1186 (noting “the discomfort some clinicians and family 
members may feel when withdrawing, rather than withholding life-sustaining 
therapies”). 
 192. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31–33 (Wis. 1999) 
(holding, in an obstetrics case, that a patient may withdraw consent in the middle 
of a procedure, which then would require a new round of disclosure); id. at 31 
(“We reject the notion that the onset of a procedure categorically forecloses a 
patient’s withdrawal of consent.  To be sure, at some point in virtually every 
medical procedure a patient reaches a point from which there is no return.”). 
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new relationship, and, even if the patient is eager to permit it, a 
physician has no obligation to comply.193  For instance, a patient 
frightened by news of problems with an implanted device may 
demand its explantation,194 but a surgeon (even if he or she 
handled the original implantation) may refuse to participate if such 
a procedure lacks medical justification.195 
One would think this even more obvious in the case of life-
saving devices implanted into a patient.  For the sake of argument, 
 
 193. See Simon, supra note 88, at 15 (“Becoming involved in ending an 
independent patient’s life [by deactivating an LVAD]—even one whose life is 
being prolonged by our previous actions (to which he consented)—would be 
impermissible.  Medicine has no role in such cases.”); Wu, supra note 3, at 532 
(“By consenting to having an implantable device placed, . . . the patient forfeits 
the right to request removal of the device without due cause.  A doctor should not 
entertain requests for removal of a pacemaker which is functioning perfectly, just 
because the patient changes his mind after informed consent.”). 
 194. See Katie Thomas, Unpredictable Danger Looms Close to the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2012, at A1 (reporting that, even though the FDA recently “recommended 
that all patients with the [St. Jude] Riata undergo imaging to see if their [ICD] 
lead was failing” but “advised against removing the leads pre-emptively,” a number 
of patients have opted to undergo the risky explantation procedure 
prophylactically).  If a medical device manufacturer recalls an implant, courts 
generally have allowed recipients to recover the costs associated with explant 
surgery and accompanying emotional distress.  See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., 
Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1285–87 (Haw. 1992).  If, however, explant surgery is not 
medically indicated but undertaken at the patient’s insistence, courts have 
rejected such claims.  See, e.g., O’Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 151, 152–54 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989).  Where defects may require explantation in limited 
circumstances, plaintiffs instead may request “medical monitoring” costs.  See, e.g., 
In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 276–78, 284–87 (S.D. Ohio 
1997), rev’d on other grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Dillon v. 
Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 366–70 (Ill. 2002) (allowing a claim for increased 
risk of future injuries where a catheter fragment became embedded in the wall of 
a patient’s heart and she had abided by medical advice against attempted 
removal). 
 195. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary 
Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That 
Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 373–74 (2009); see also 
Mitesh S. Amin et al., Management of Recalled Pacemakers and Implantable Cardioverter-
Defibrillators: A Decision Analysis Model, 296 JAMA 412, 419 (2006); Paul A. Gould & 
Andrew D. Krahn, Complications Associated with Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator 
Replacement in Response to Device Advisories, 295 JAMA 1907, 1910 (2006) (“ICD 
generator replacement is not a benign procedure and carries a substantial risk of 
complications, which include death.”); David Brown, Implantable Defibrillators Can 
Be Erratic, Studies Find, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2006, at A8 (“[P]eople who learn that 
the device implanted in their chest may have a defect should think hard before 
having it replaced.  Switching it out may be more risky than leaving it in.”); Barry 
Meier, A Life or Death Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at B1 (describing some of 
the difficulties involved in removing defective ICD leads). 
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take wireless programmers out of the picture, so that the only way 
to deactivate a cardiac-assist device would require explantation.  If a 
physician agreed to remove such a device at the patient’s request, 
then death could result directly from a procedure that did not 
promise any therapeutic benefit.  The HRS consensus statement 
included the following concession: 
Patients might request removal of generator and/or leads 
rather than reprogramming.  Since the same effect can be 
obtained by reprogramming and as surgical intervention 
carries with it significant chance of introduction of a new 
life-threatening pathology (e.g., infection, and/or 
mechanical complications of lead extraction), surgical 
intervention is not recommended.  Legally, patients have 
a right to refuse any treatment, but do not have the right 
to demand mistreatment.196 
But, again, what if we assume away the ability to deactivate 
wirelessly—does the patient’s right to withdraw consent then mean 
an ability to insist on explantation surgery?197 Although the ease of 
noninvasive deactivation offered an easy out in this context,198 the 
 
 196. Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1012 (“A physician may judge the 
removal reasonable under the particular circumstances and do so with informed 
consent, but there is no ethical or legal obligation to meet this request.”).  
Occasionally, explantation may have medical justification.  See Michael Geist et al., 
Permanent Explantation of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators, 23 PACING & CLINICAL 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 2024, 2026, 2028 (2000). 
 197. Cf. Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 545 (“Some devices, such as 
ventriculoperitoneal shunts, lack on/off settings and, after they have served their 
intended purpose and are no longer clinically needed, they are nonetheless not 
explanted due to surgical risks.”); Jansen, supra note 59, at 107 (“Not 
unreasonably, clinicians would balk at actively dismantling a patient’s mechanical 
heart valve as a means to hastening his death.  At least in most cases, such an 
intervention would plausibly be described as a killing rather than as a withdrawal 
of aid.”); Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1012 (“Most would regard carrying out a 
request to deactivate a pacemaker in a terminally-ill patient as far less morally 
problematic than carrying out a request to remove an implanted porcine heart 
valve in the same patient.  Deactivating a pacemaker is non-invasive and does not 
introduce a new pathology.”); Veatch, supra note 87, at 308 (imagining a scenario 
where removal would pose little separate risk: a lung cancer patient undergoing 
exploratory chest surgery); Wu, supra note 3, at 532 (“In devices that do not have 
an off button or require sustaining [e.g., drug] therapy, neither the doctor nor the 
patient has the right to remove it for futility or autonomy reasons, just as the 
practice has been for renal transplants for the past few decades.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Spike, supra note 84, at 26 (“[A] pacemaker is [more] like a 
portable ventilator [than an implanted heart valve], in that it is a life-sustaining 
mechanical device whose source of control is external to the patient’s body.”).  
Ventricular assist devices may, however, pose additional complexities if not also 
explanted.  See supra note 93 (discussing consequences of LVAD deactivation 
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/7
  
2013] DEACTIVATING CARDIAC DEVICES 1279 
doctrine of informed consent can at best only partially explain a 
patient’s right to demand withdrawal of an implanted life-
sustaining treatment.199 
Moreover, the prior decision to allow implantation of a 
cardiac-assist device seems to represent the polar opposite of an 
advance directive declining resuscitation—for instance, elderly 
patients might want an ICD as insurance against the fear that, in 
the event of a cardiac arrhythmia, health care professionals 
otherwise might not undertake resuscitation on grounds of 
futility200 (or, in the event of later incapacity, a surrogate 
 
without explantation); see also Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 546 (“In 
some ways, deactivating an LVAD is similar to turning off a ventilator, while 
leaving the endotracheal tube in place.  This action would make spontaneous 
respiration even more difficult for the patient due to the increased dead space of 
the tube.”).  Nonetheless, these commentators defended the ethical propriety of 
deactivation:  “[A]lthough an implanted and yet unpowered LVAD may pose some 
clinical harm to the patient, it is not equivalent to active killing of the patient, as 
would be evident, for example, by infusion of a massive dose of potassium 
chloride.”  Id. at 547. (“The distinction between removing the LVAD and other 
life-sustaining treatment is subtle but significant, and yet both are quite different 
than the active promotion of death by external intervention.”). 
 199. Consider this foundational premise in the HRS consensus statement: “If a 
clinician initiates or continues a treatment that a patient (or his/her surrogate) 
has refused, then ethically and legally the clinician is committing battery, 
regardless of the clinician’s intent.”  Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1010.  In what 
sense does an electrophysiologist unlawfully “continue” treatment with a 
previously implanted CIED after a patient experiences a change of heart (pun 
intended)?!  Cf. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 69 (“Patients and cardiologists alike 
seem to view implanting an ICD as a ‘bridge’ that one crosses with no possibility of 
return.”); Veatch, supra note 87, at 307 (“We do not have a well-developed analysis 
of whether physicians faced with a refusal of continuing consent for the use of 
these implanted technologies must remove them—as they would a trach tube or 
ventilator—or must merely cease supporting their function.  If they must merely 
back off from support, the[se] . . . would, of course, continue to function for some 
time.”). 
 200. See Richard A. Knox, Study Finds ICU Doctors Withholding Treatment, BOS. 
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1995, at A1 (reporting that “doctors often act unilaterally to 
terminate life-sustaining treatment”); see also supra note 170.  In one interesting 
article, a couple of physicians explained what they saw as the benefits of ICD 
deactivation at the end of life: “[I]n cases of terminal illness a sudden arrhythmic 
cardiac death may be desirable to potentially reduce the period of suffering.”  
Richard Kobza & Paul Erne, End-of-Life Decisions in ICD Patients with Malignant 
Tumors, 30 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 845, 845 (2007).  Their survey 
of a small group of fully informed ICD patients with advanced cancer surprised 
them.  See id. at 848 (“[A]lthough all six patients had previously suffered from an 
appropriate or inappropriate ICD shock, none approved deactivation of their 
ICD.”); id. (“[W]e [mistakenly] expected that some of our patients with an ICD 
and terminal cancer would have wished for a deactivation of their ICD.”); see also 
Anders Ågård et al., Views of Patients with Heart Failure About Their Role in the Decision 
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decisionmaker declines it201).  No doubt recipients may come to 
regret such choices, based perhaps on their experience with the 
devices202 (or, as discussed herein, the development of an unrelated 
terminal illness not contemplated at the time of implantation203), 
but the informed consent doctrine fails to establish any subsequent 
right to insist on removal (or, by extension, the far less complicated 
step of wireless deactivation).204 
 
to Start Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Treatment: Prescription Rather Than 
Participation, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 514, 517 (2007) (finding that some recipients view 
ICDs as “life insurance”); Garrick C. Stewart et al., Patient Expectations from 
Implantable Defibrillators to Prevent Death in Heart Failure, 16 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 106, 
110 (2010) (“[M]ost [ICD patients surveyed] indicated that they would not 
consider inactivating defibrillation even in the presence of end-stage heart failure 
or other disease.”). 
 201. See Paola & Walker, supra note 172, at 20–21 (offering such an illustration, 
but making no mention of the original implantation decision as a relevant factor 
when the surrogate later consents to a DNR order).  This could become important 
if a proxy requests CIED deactivation for an incompetent patient.  Although 
individuals can always change their minds, and modify or rescind an advance 
directive, the implanted device, especially an ICD implanted in a situation where 
the patient has not (yet) experienced an arrhythmia, see Pasquale Santangeli et al., 
Meta-Analysis: Age and Effectiveness of Prophylactic Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators, 
153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 592, 597–98 (2010), seems to speak loudly about the 
recipient’s preferences, see Rady & Verheijde, supra note 95, at 1087 (noting that, 
“if the device is deactivated without the onset of [an unrelated] life-threatening 
illness, then the mode of death is what patients have objected to when consenting 
to device implantation”); see also John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues in 
Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1854 (2003) (“[I]t strikes me as helpful to view the 
use of implantable defibrillators as a type of precommitment.”).  Perhaps that 
means a default rule of deactivating CIEDs only at the insistence of patients at the 
end-of-life or by explicit mention in an advance directive. 
 202. See Arash Arya et al., Prevalence and Predictors of Electrical Storm in Patients 
with Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 97 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 389 (2006); Margret 
Leosdottir et al., Health-Related Quality of Life of Patients with Implantable Cardioverter 
Defibrillators Compared with That of Pacemaker Recipients, 8 EUROPACE 168 (2006); 
Huagui Li et al., Causes and Consequences of Discontinuation of the Implantable 
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Therapy in Non-Terminally Ill Patients, 81 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 
1203, 1204 (1998). 
 203. See Jeffrey T. Berger et al., Advance Health Planning and Treatment 
Preferences Among Recipients of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators: An Exploratory 
Study, 17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 72, 74, 76 (2006) (finding some “evolution of 
preferences” in this regard); Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 11 (predicting the 
same); see also Stacey Burling, Mechanical-Heart Patient Comes to Regret His Life-Saving 
Choice, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 2002, at A1; cf. Strachan et al., supra note 33, at 7 
(“Interestingly, when asked to anticipate their preferences should they become 
terminally ill, the majority of patients with heart failure who received an ICD for 
primary prevention said they would not deactivate it, even if they were receiving 
daily shocks.”). 
 204. Separately, some commentators fear that denying a right of later 
withdrawal will make physicians and patients more apt to refuse potentially 
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C. Navigating Imprecise Legislative Boundaries 
The characterization problem does not arise solely in 
constitutional and common-law litigation.  Indeed, because 
ultimately the question boils down to whether physicians might risk 
prosecution, one must pay attention to ambiguities and variations 
among different state statutes as they might apply to the 
deactivation of implanted cardiac-assist devices.205  Most states have 
laws that allow individuals to execute advance directives to decline 
life-sustaining treatments and exempt physician involvement in 
such cases from prohibitions on assisting suicide.206  A few state laws 
go further and authorize physician-assisted suicide, though only in 
limited circumstances,207 while leaving withdrawal requests largely 
 
beneficial interventions from the outset.  See Cantor, supra note 44, at 1804–05 & 
n.65; Philip G. Peters, Jr. et al., Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube Feeding After 
Cruzan: An Empirical Study, 57 MO. L. REV. 831, 834–35 & n.17, 838–40 (1992).  
Whether or not this suffices to make the two types of choices equivalent, the 
available research on patient views of cardiac-assist devices suggests that it is highly 
unlikely to occur in this setting.  As for physicians, perhaps they should think more 
carefully before implanting such devices in very elderly or frail patients.  Lastly, of 
course, this concern presumably would not suffice to allow “deactivation” of 
transplanted hearts or other critical organs. 
 205. See Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
An Assessment and Comparison of Statutory Approaches Among the States, 32 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 13, 64 (2007) (finding a “wide degree of variation among the states with 
respect to physician-assisted suicide”). 
 206. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 & n.2, 805 n.9 (1997); Meisel, 
supra note 140, at 822 (“Passively hastening death includes refusal of treatment, 
termination of life support, forgoing treatment, or withholding and withdrawing 
treatment, and variants on these terms.”); Marni J. Lerner, Note, State Natural 
Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals’ Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 184–85 & n.45, 187–208, 212–21 (1992).  Several states also 
create a limited safe harbor for “terminal sedation.”  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 780 & n.15 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see also George P. Smith, 
II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to a Good Death, 7 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382, 382 (1998).  At least one state’s statute 
provides a non-exhaustive list of covered treatments.  See Illinois Living Will Act, 
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 35/2(d) (2012).  Legislators also have amended these 
statutes to address ambiguities about whether they reach artificial nutrition and 
hydration.  See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 149, § 7.07[B]. 
 207. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 
(2012); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2012); 
Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009); see also Katie Hafner, In Ill 
Doctor, a Surprise Reflection of Who Picks Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at 
A1 (noting limited use of the two statutes); Kim Severson, Georgia Court Rejects Law 
Aimed at Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A19 (reporting that Vermont 
and Massachusetts are considering legislation to authorize physician-assisted 
suicide, while 37 states criminalize it). 
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unencumbered by any restrictions.208  Conversely, rather than rely 
on existing and generally applicable prohibitions on assisting 
suicide, a couple of states have enacted legislation specifically 
designed to ban physician aid in dying.209  Putting aside the 
relatively low likelihood of detection or prosecution, consensus 
statements from professional groups approving an end-of-life 
practice such as CIED deactivation provide no meaningful 
assurance against legal jeopardy in such cases.210 
D. “Kill” Switches to the Rescue? 
Congress did not impose licensure requirements for medical 
devices until 1976, a move prompted in part by widely publicized 
pacemaker recalls.211  Over the last decade, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has confronted tricky regulatory difficulties 
with CIEDs, but these have revolved around the threat of 
malfunctions involving life-sustaining products,212 especially 
 
 208. Cf. Susan M. Wolf, Holding the Line on Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Jan.–Feb. 1989 (Special Supp.), at 13 (warning that recognition of a right to 
physician assistance might encroach on the heretofore broad right to decline or 
withdraw).  In other words, even in places like Oregon, patients seeking physician 
assistance in deactivating cardiac-assist devices would prefer that it get 
characterized as a request for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment rather 
than PAS. 
 209. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 205, at 49–50 (Arkansas and Rhode 
Island).  Perhaps feeling hemmed in by three of its neighboring states that allow 
the practice, Idaho passed such a law in 2011.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017(3)–
(6) (2012); see also id. § 18-4017(5)(b) (exempting a “health care professional who 
withholds or withdraws treatment or procedures” upon request from the patient 
or a proxy). 
 210. Cf. Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1023 (“[T]here are European 
countries where deactivation of antibradycardia pacing in pacemaker dependent 
patient[s] is prohibited by law.  It is therefore crucial that clinicians are aware of 
the legal situation in the country and jurisdiction in which they are practicing.”). 
 211. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Loops and Loopholes: Hazardous Device Regulation 
Under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 7 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 101, 102 & n.4 (1978); see also Robin Miller, Annotation, Products 
Liability: Cardiac Pacemakers, 23 A.L.R. 6TH 223 (2007 & Supp. 2012) (canvassing 
some of the case law that has emerged from tort litigation over pacemakers and 
ICDs). 
 212. See Kim A. Eagle, Editorial, Safety Alerts Involving Device Therapy for 
Arrhythmias, 286 JAMA 843, 844 (2001); William H. Maisel et al., Pacemaker and ICD 
Generator Malfunctions: Analysis of Food and Drug Administration Annual Reports, 295 
JAMA 1901, 1904–05 (2006); Marc Kaufman, More Heart Devices Malfunction; As 
Sophistication Has Grown, So Have Failures, FDA Reports, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, 
at A7; see also Barry Meier, F.D.A. Seeks Better Data from Tests of Devices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2009, at B1 (summarizing reviews that found problems with the quality of 
information submitted to the agency in support of high-risk cardiovascular 
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questions about when to order recalls or recommend 
explantation.213  Now, instead of potential failures or other safety 
problems, the agency also might have to worry that the devices 
work too well or last too long.  Rarely, however, does “overefficacy” 
counsel against product approval,214 and the FDA typically does not 
consider ethical questions when reviewing licensing applications.215 
To the extent that health care professionals refuse to assist, 
whether on ethical grounds or from fears of prosecution (well-
founded or not),216 a few commentators have called on 
 
devices). 
 213. See Edward M. Basile & Beverly H. Lorell, The Food and Drug 
Administration’s Regulation of Risk Disclosure for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators: 
Has Technology Outpaced the Agency’s Regulatory Framework?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
251, 261, 265–69 (2006). 
 214. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 654–59, 663, 664–65 (2003) (concluding 
that the FDA should revisit previously granted licenses for ovulation-inducing 
agents because of their tendency to result in dangerous multifetal pregnancies); 
id. at 628 (“Normally, efficacy and safety operate independently of one 
another . . . .  In the case of fertility drugs, however, the primary risk inheres in 
their very effectiveness.”). 
 215. See Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law 
in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1197 (focusing on 
enhancement technologies, especially the approval of human growth hormone for 
otherwise healthy children of short stature, and concluding that “the FDA’s one-
size-fits-all system of approval is unsuited to evaluate the ethical concerns 
accompanying the emerging class of medical products that act not to prevent 
disease or restore health, but instead to reduce wrinkles or enlarge breasts or 
sharpen memory”).  The agency’s review of TAHs provided a stark illustration of 
this gap.  See David Brown, Artificial Heart Gets Limited FDA Approval: Device, Which 
Can Provide Extra Months of Life, Meets Humanitarian Provision, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 
2006, at A8 (discussing the fully implanted AbioCor, which extended patients’ lives 
by approximately four months at a cost of $350,000); Rob Stein, FDA Approves 
Artificial Heart for Those Awaiting Transplant; Doctors Hail the $100,000 Device, but 
Critics Question Whether Cost Is Justified, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2004, at A3 (reporting 
that SynCardia’s update of the Jarvik-7 as a bridge to transplant represented a 
milestone as “the first [FDA-approved device] to supplant most of the functions of 
the heart or any other major organ,” but adding that “critics questioned the value 
of the $100,000 device, saying it will only add expense to the nation’s already 
bloated health care bill without increasing the number of heart patients who 
survive” because it does nothing about the underlying shortage of organs available 
for transplant). 
 216. See Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical 
Practices, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 596 tbl.1 (2007) (finding, for instance, that 
17% of surveyed physicians objected to terminal sedation); id. at 597 (adding that 
“29% of patients—or nearly 100 million Americans—may be cared for by 
physicians who do not believe they have an obligation to refer the patient to 
another provider for such [controversial] treatments”); Lampert et al., supra note 
99, at 1013 (recognizing that conscientious objectors could decline to deactivate 
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manufacturers to supply recipients with clear directions or a simple 
mechanism for disabling implanted cardiac-assist devices.217  Insofar 
as physicians often fail to broach the subject at the time of 
implantation, the FDA could require better patient labeling that 
included such information.218  Less plausibly, the agency could 
demand the inclusion of patient-controlled remote deactivation 
switches in the design of these devices, but, even if one could 
overcome serious practical difficulties, any technological fix 
empowering patients to act on their own undoubtedly would 
trigger a variety of objections. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This hardly represents the first time that technological 
advances have affected previously settled legal lines.219  In the 
 
CIEDs); Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care: Myths, Realities, 
and Grains of Truth, 284 JAMA 2495, 2495–96 (2000). 
 217. See Deborah Grassman, Letter, EOL Considerations in Defibrillator 
Deactivation, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 179, 179 (2005) (wondering 
whether ICD manufacturers should take responsibility for supplying printed 
patient education materials and perhaps also magnets allowing for self-
deactivation); Raphael et al., supra note 33, at 1632 (“We looked at the possibility 
of a variable switch-off mode for future device development. . . .  Theoretically, 
toward the end of life, the [ICD] could be programed so it was inactive while the 
patient was asleep, allowing a peaceful death from natural causes if a life-
threatening arrhythmia were to occur during this time.”); cf. Lampert et al., supra 
note 99, at 1021 (“suggest[ing] that clinicians consider providing a doughnut 
magnet (along with specific instructions on its use) to [ICD] patients who are 
diagnosed with a terminal illness”).  Researchers gave the first recipient of an 
artificial heart just such a mechanism.  See James Rachels, Barney Clark’s Key, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1983, at 17. 
 218. Recently, the agency has mandated that physicians secure written 
informed consent from patients—coupled with other restrictions on prescribing 
and dispensing certain drugs—though in order to ensure against inappropriate 
use that carries serious risks of injury.  See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to 
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 188–91 
(2004) (discussing a variety of distribution restrictions on prescription drugs 
considered by regulatory officials); Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The 
FDA Burdens Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 234–36 (2007) (focusing 
on teratogens such as Accutane and Thalomid); see also Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 
823, 930 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355–1(f)(3)(A) (2012)) (granting the FDA 
express authority to impose such restrictions). 
 219. See Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and Standards of Review 
Under Pressure from Biological Technologies, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 385–86, 417–18, 
422–27, 484–86 (2001); id. at 462 (“[A]lterations in the technological terrain have 
pushed us beyond simple conceptualizations of life and death.”); id. at 468 
(referring to “category straddling induced by technological changes”); see also id. 
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context of abortion, for example, improvements in neonatology 
have dramatically lowered the threshold of fetal viability,220 thereby 
undermining the trimester framework suggested in Roe v. Wade.221  
Some critics might respond that CIEDs offer further evidence of 
incoherence in the distinctions originally drawn by the Supreme 
Court in the right-to-die cases,222 though proponents of those lines 
likely would not relent, instead taking comfort in the views of most 
medical ethicists that equate deactivation with the permissible 
withdrawals of other forms of life-sustaining treatment.  Perhaps 
categorical judgments (one way or another) ultimately must 
remain elusive—homogeneity does not exist among implanted 
cardiac-assist devices, much less among the various patients who 
might request their deactivation—so that one cannot escape paying 
greater attention to nuance, especially the extent to which a patient 
is device dependent (both in the sense that the implant has turned 
a terminal illness into a successfully managed chronic condition, 
and in the sense that withdrawal likely spells doom for the patient). 
Implanted cardiac-assist devices pose serious challenges to the 
well-accepted equivalence between refusing and requesting the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments.  No doubt many judges 
would find deactivation lawful because—perhaps taking a cue from 
the near consensus among medical ethicists—it shares enough 
superficial similarities with the withdrawal of other interventions.  
 
at 442 (cautioning against “exaggerat[ing] the degree of conceptual innovation 
that constitutional jurisprudence will have to bear as biomedical technology 
develops”). 
 220. See Kathy L. Kyser et al., Improving Survival of Extremely Preterm Infants Born 
Between 22 and 25 Weeks of Gestation, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 795, 800 
(2012); Noah, supra note 214, at 619–20 & nn.70–71; Christine Hauser, For the 
Tiniest Babies, the Closest Thing to a Cocoon, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at F1 
(reporting that the record for viability had dropped below 22 weeks of gestation). 
 221. 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973); see also id. at 160 (conceding that viability 
may occur earlier); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860, 870 
(1992) (recognizing this development); id. at 872–73 (rejecting as unduly “rigid” 
the trimester framework); Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping 
Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 641, 655–62 (1986) (same); Jessica H. Schultz, Note, 
Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or 
Embryo?, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 877, 886–88 (2010) (anticipating the consequences 
of possible future advances); cf. John Leland, Abortion Might Outgrow Its Need for 
Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 4, at 14 (explaining that, “while 
combatants focus on the law, technology is already changing the future of 
abortion,” particularly with the off-label use of misoprostol to induce a 
miscarriage). 
 222. Cf. Orentlicher, supra note 146, at 963–64 (making such a point about the 
Court’s willingness to countenance terminal sedation). 
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Even if patients should enjoy the freedom to cease using implanted 
cardiac-assist devices, I have little use for such charades.223  
Deactivation represents a distinctive form of physician aid in dying, 
one that we should allow candidly rather than by pretending that it 
fits comfortably within the existing category of permissible 
withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment.224  Thus, states should 
consider amending their statutes to clearly authorize physician 
deactivation of some or all cardiac-assist devices,225 subject to 
whatever collateral restrictions seem appropriate.  In addition to 
confirming the legality of deactivation, revisions to these advance 
directive statutes should prompt specific questions about patients’ 
wishes about the continued use of their implanted cardiac-assist 
devices. 
 
 223. See Cantor, supra note 44, at 1841 (objecting to “the hypocrisy of 
pretending that contemporary American society truly bars PAD [physician-assisted 
death]”); cf. Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1152–61 (2004) (lambasting an effort to sidestep 
controversy over research using embryonic stem cells simply by redefining certain 
terms); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1638–52 (2001) 
(decrying judicial tolerance of jurors’ tendencies to disregard their instructions in 
tort litigation); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 296–306 (1999) (criticizing physician dishonesty). 
 224. Twenty years ago, one prominent bioethicist drew the following 
conclusion pertinent to this set of problems: 
There is no denying that a substantial moral and legal consensus exists 
about how to handle most cases involving forgoing of life-sustaining 
treatment.  The core elements seem firmly established.  Yet as we apply 
that consensus to more and more cases we discover novel situations to 
which the consensus cannot be applied directly.  Unlike the controversy 
over active mercy killing, it is not necessarily that there is enormous 
moral or legal disagreement about these cases.  Rather we are discovering 
new twists on the old problems for which our old principles . . . do not 
provide clear conclusions.  We are ready for a new generation of moral 
debates in the ethics of terminal care from which newer, more subtle 
guidelines will have to emerge. 
Robert M. Veatch, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Limits to the Consensus, 3 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 17–18 (1993). 
 225. See Paola et al., supra note 148, at 37 (concluding that a DNR order would 
allow for ICD deactivation, but adding that “clarification via an amendment to the 
[applicable New York] statute or the regulations would be welcome”); cf. Timothy 
E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping 
Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099, 2104 (1997) (“Explicit public policies about which of 
these 4 practices are permissible and under what circumstances could have 
important benefits.”).  But cf. Brody, supra note 137, at 962 n.68 (“[T]here is 
relatively little established law, either statutory or case law, regarding these ‘fence-
sitting’ cases. . . .  Many physicians probably prefer that the law remain silent on 
these cases and that they be handled in the future by medical discretion . . . .”). 
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